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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
RIQO-M PEREA, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
. 
.. 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH1 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
. 
.. 
Appellate Court No. 201501445-
CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is. an appeal from an Order of Summary Dismissal on the ~ 
Petitioner's Petition for Relief under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act 
···-filed- November 11, 2014 as well-as-the· Order on Petitioner's Metien-£ ..... or~--~ 
Relief from Judgment entered on October 16, 2015. Jurisdiction of This 
Court is conferred by Utah Code Ann. §78A-4-103(2)G). 
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
POINT I 
1 
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN DENYING THE PETITIONER'S 
MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO RULE 
6o(b)(6) OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND 
THEREBY VIOLATE HIS STATE AND FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTIONAL DUE PROCESS RIGHTS? 
PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUE: The issue was preserved by the filing of 
the Rule 6o(b)(6) motion with the court. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The Utah Court of Appeals review of a District 
Court's denial of a 6o(b) motion is under an abuse of discretion standard of 
vu review. There are limits to the discretion of the District Court however as 
set forth in the case of Menzies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81, ,I 54, 150 P.3d 480, 
where the court held: 
The majority of Menzies' arguments on appeal deal with the district 
court's 6o(b) ruling. A district court has broad discretion to rule on a 
motion to set aside a default judgment under rule 6o(b) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. See Lund v. Brown, 2000 ur 75, ,I 9, 11 P.3d 
277; Russell v. Martell, 681 P.2d 1193, 1194 (Utah 1984); State Dep't 
of Soc. Servs. v. Musselman, 667 P .2d 1053, 1055 (Utah 1983). Thus, 
we review a district court's denial of a 6o(b) motion *502 under an 
abuse of discretion standard of review. Russell, 681 P.2d at 1194. 
However, we have emphasized that "the [district] court's discretion is 
riot unlimited." Lund, ·2000 · UT 75, ,I 9, 11 P .3d· 277. It is well · 
established that 6o(b) motions should be liberally granted because of 
the equitable nature of the rule. Id. ,I 10. Therefore, a district court 
should exercise its discretion in favor of granting relief so that 
controversies can be decided on the merits rather than on 
technicalities. See id.; Musselman, 667 P.2d at 1055-56. Accordingly, 
it is an abuse of discretion for a district court to deny a 6o(b) motion 
to set aside a default judgment if there is a reasonable justification for 
the moving party's failure and the party requested 6o(b) relief in a 
timely fashion. Lund, 2000 UT 75, ,I 11, 11 P .3d 277 
2 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
United States Constitution 
Sixth Amendment - Rights of Accused in Criminal Prosecutions 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been 
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause 
of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to 
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have 
the Assistance of Counsel for his defense. 
Fourteenth Amendment - Rights Guaranteed Privileges and 
Immunities of Citizenship, Due Process and Equal Protection 
Section. 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of 
the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws. 
Utah Constitution 
Article I, Section 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due 
process of law. 
-----
Article I, Section 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
.. In criminal prosecutions_the accused shall have the right to appear_a ..... n~d.__ __ _ 
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own belf='all£f,~---
. · · --· --to· be-confronted by the witnesses against him,·-to have compulsory-process 
to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy 
3 
public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the 
offense is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all 
cases. In no instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be 
compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. 
The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife 
shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against 
his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, 
the function of that examination is limited to determining whether probable 
cause exists unless otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this 
constitution shall preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined 
by statute or rule in whole or in part at any preliminary examination to 
determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with respect to 
release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by 
statute or rule. 
Utah Code Annotated 
§76-5-202 Aggravated Murder (in relevant part) 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes aggravated murder if the actor 
intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another under any of the 
following circumstances: 
(b) the homicide was committed incident to one act, scheme, course of 
conduct, or criminal episode during which two or more persons were killed, 
or during which the actor attempted to kill one or more persons in addition 
to the victim who was killed; 
4 
§78A-4-103(2)G) 
The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including 
jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: cases transferred to the Court 
of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
Rule 6o(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered 
evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the 
court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal 
representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the 
following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable 
neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not 
have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) 
fraud · ( whether · heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), 
misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; ( 4) the 
judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or 
discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed 
or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should 
have prospective application; or ( 6) any other reason justifying relief from 
the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a 
reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), or (3), not more than 90 days after 
the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under 
this Subdivision (b) does not affect the :finality of a judgment or suspend its 
operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an 
independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding 
or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for 
obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in 
these rules or by an independent action. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Defendant was charged by Information with two counts of 
Aggravated Murder, a Capital felony in violation of UCA §76-5-202 
together with three other felony charges. On March 9, 2010 through March 
16, 2010, the case was tried to a jury and on March 16, 2010, the jury found 
the defendant guilty of all five counts of the information. (R. 1375-84 in 
appellate case no. 20100891). On May 27, 2010, the defendant was 
sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. R. 1566 in appellate case 
no. 20100891). 
A Petition for Relief under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act was 
filed by Petitioner on November 12, 2014, and was summarily dismissed on 
January 12, 2015. An appeal was filed on February 11, 2015 and a motion 
for relief from judgment was filed on July 23, 2015. After remand to the 
trial court, the trial court issued a ruling denying the motion on October 16, 
2015. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. In 2007 the Petitioner Riqo Perea was charged with two counts of 
Aggravated Murder, a Capital Felony, together with two counts of 
Attempted Aggravated Murder, a first-degree felony. 
2. This case went to trial beginning March 9, 2010 and concluding with 
a guilty verdict to all charges rendered by the jury on March 16, 2010. 
3. The matter was appealed to the Utah Supreme Court and 
although the court found numerous errors, the judgment was affirmed 
6 
based upon the Utah Supreme Court's finding that the errors were 
harmless due to the overwhelming evidence of guilt. This overwhelming 
evidence of guilt was founded on the testimony of Sarah Valencia, who 
testified that she witnessed Riqo Perea shooting the fatal and wounding 
shots. (See State v. Perea, 2013 UT, 322 P.3d 624, a copy of that decision 
is attached as Addendum A to this brief) 
4. On November 12, 2014, the petitioner filed the current petition 
under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act, and that petition was denied by 
this court on October 16, 2015. (See copy of Ruling and Order attached as 
Addendum B to this brief). 
5. The judgment on that matter was then appealed to the Utah 
Supreme Court on February 11, 2015. (See notice of appeal attached as 
Addendum C to this brief). 
6. On July 2, 2015 Sarah Valencia came into the office of Randall 
W. Richards and declared that she wanted to sign an affidavit recanting 
the testimony that she had given the trial due to the fact that it was 
incorrect, and she had been pressured to testify falsely due to threats by 
the police. (A copy of that affidavit is attached as Addendum D to this 
brief). 
7 
7. A review of that affidavit would clearly indicate that her 
testimony given at the trial of petitioner Rigo Perea, was false, and in 
large part resulted in his conviction and life sentence, which was 
--a thereafter affirmed by the Supreme Court of Utah. 
8. There were only three other witnesses that potentially put the 
gun in the hand of Rigo Perea. Two of those witnesses, Angelo Gallegos, 
and Elias Garcia were both potential suspects and both testified against 
Rigo Perea and as a result were not charged. (The relevant portions of 
those witnesses testimony are attached as Addendum E to this brief). 
9. The other witness, Dominique Duran, gave a very contradictory 
testimony, with claims that she did not remember what happened that 
night. The only evidence that implicated Rigo Perea was actually read to 
vJ the witness and she simply gave her affirmation. On page 26 of the trial 
transcript of her testimony she makes the following response to the 
question: 
Q. Do you remember during the course of this statement Detective 
John Thomas, who's seated right here in the courtroom, coming to 
you and emphasizing that it was important for you to tell the truth? 
A. Yes. He threatened me a lot, yes. 
10. Since the testimony of Sarah Valencia is absolutely essential for 
the court to make a reasoned decision on this Rule 6o(b) motion, the 
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relevant portions of that testimony are included '-'Vith the trial transcript 
pages as follows: 
Pg. 85--86 (Direct) 
(After arguing begins in the street) "That's when me and Sabrina 
went in to get Anthony, because it was his house, thinking maybe 
that he could maybe stop the argument from going on. All I 
remember is being inside, and Ashley Gill ran in and said there was a 
shot in the air. And we went back outside, and that's when I seen the 
SUV pulling off, and I seen Riqo over the top, shooting." 
Pg. 92--95 (Direct) 
Q. When you gave that first statement did you tell the police that 
Riqo was the shooter? 
A.No. 
Q. Why not? 
A. I was scared. 
Q. Why were you scared? 
A Because I was getting threatened. 
Q. How were you being threatened? 
A Phone calls. 
Q. Do you know who was making the phone calls? 
A. I don't. 
Q. This is the middle of the night, correct? 1, 2, 3 am? 
A. Uh--huh 
Q. Did you the following day, on the morning of the 5th, Sunday, I 
believe, did you in fact go to the Ogden City Police Department and 
provide another statement, a detailed statement, question and 
answer statement to a detective? 
A Yes 
Q. What time did that take place? 
A. Maybe 9, 10. 
Q. It was daylight out; is that right? 
A. Yes 
Q. And whaLdid...Jron do between the time you__were_at.the hospital 
and the time you went down to the police station? A Nothing really. 
Q. Were you able to go home and go to sleep? 
ANo. 
Q. You did in fact at that time provide another detailed written 
statement; is that right? 
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A. Yes 
Q. Did you describe the facts for that detective as you have described 
them today? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you have Riqo as the person over the front of the car, 
shooting? 
A On my second statement? 
Q. Yes. 
A.No. 
Q. Why not? 
A. Because I was scared. 
Q. Again, why were you scared? 
A. I was still getting threatening phone calls. 
Q. Did you have Riqo in that statement as one of two people who was 
shooting? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And did you have Riqo in the front passenger seat? 
A Yes 
Q. (Approximately a week later) Did Detective Gent come down and 
ask you to give another statement? 
A. Yes 
Q. In that written statement did you identify Riqo as the person 
doing the shooting? 
A. Yes 
Q. Did Detective Gent ask you why you hadn't identified Riqo in the 
first two? 
A Yes 
Q. What did you tell him? 
A That I was scared and I was being threatened 
Q. Did you in fact see this defendant come over the top of that red 
SUV and fire a gun many times? 
A Yes 
Pg. 107 (Cross) 
Q. And from there you see people get into the car, and then you could 
see the people shooting? 
A. I seen Riqo shooting. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
This appeal arises out of a Petition for Relief under the Post-
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Conviction Remedies Act was filed by Petitioner on November 12, 2014, 
which was summarily dismissed on January 12, 2015. After the appeal was 
filed, a Rule 6o(b)(6) motion for relief from judgment was filed on July 23, 
2015 and the request for remand was granted. After remand to the trial 
court, the trial court issued a ruling denying the motion. 
The Rule 6o(b)(6) motion was premised entirely upon a recantation 
of the main witness at trial, Sarah Valencia, who identified Riqo Perea as 
the shooter. This recantation, when juxtaposed with the Supreme Court of 
Utah's finding on direct appeal of numerous errors in the trial, but denying ~ 
reversal based upon overwhelming evidence, suggests that the relief from 
judgment should be granted in the interest of justice. 
An analysis of the Court's decision on direct appeal (State v. Perea, 
2013 UT, 322 P.3d 624) suggests that the "overwhelming evidence of guilt" 
is premised primarily upon the eyewitness testimony of Sarah Valencia. 
While two other individuals testified that Riqo Perea was the shooter, those 
two individuals were original suspects in the case, and both were never 
-cliarged but testified, thereby calling the- question their bias and reliaoility. 
Even more troubling is the fact that several witnesses, including Sarah ~ 
Valencia-in he:r recantation affidavit,. claim. that police officers threatened __ 
and coerced false testimony during the course of the original trial. This 
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coercion, if it in fact occurred, would instigate the application of the Due 
Process Clause of the State and Federal Constitutions. 
Given all of these facts, and the tenuous nature of the testimony relied 
on by the Supreme Court of Utah in making a finding of overwhelming 
evidence of guilt, the interest of justice request under Rule 6o(b)(6) should 
. J have been granted by the trial court. It is for these reasons that the 
petitioner is requesting this Court reverse the trial court and grant the 
judgment requested. 
1,.;) 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE PETITIONER'S 
MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO RULE 
6o(b)(6) OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, AND 
THEREBY VIOLATED HIS STATE AND FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTIONAL DUE PROCESS RIGHTS. 
Rule 6o(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides relief 
from judgment based upon "any other reason justifying relief from the 
operation of the judgment." In the case before this Court, significant and 
unambiguous evidence that the main witness for the prosecution during the 
trial of Mr. Perea testified falsely. This recantation of testimony, combined 
with the Supreme Court of Utah's ruling on the direct appeal of the 
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conviction certainly would qualify as "other reason for justifying relief from 
the operation of the judgment." Rule 6o(b)(6) is included to prevent a 
manifest injustice. 
In the case of_Menzies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81, ,r 71, 150 P .3d 480, the 
Supreme Court of Utah ruled that the trial court's denial of a Rule 6o(b)(6) 
motion was improper due to both the nature of the case (a capital 
conviction and sentence) as well as the overwhelming indications of 
- injustice. In that case the court held: 
Rule 6o(b)(6) is the "catch-all" provision of rule 6o(b). It 
providesthat a party may be relievedfrom· ajudgment for "any 
other reason justifying relief from the operation of the 
judgment." Utah R. Civ. P. 6o(b)(6) (emphasis added). Because 
rule 6o(b)(6) is meant to operate as a residuary clause, it may 
not be relied upon if the asserted grounds for relief fall within 
. any other subsection of rule 6o(b)." See· Cmty. Dental Servs. v. 
Tani, 282 F.3d 1164, 1168 (9th Cir.2002); Russell, 681 P.2d at 
1195; Laub v. S. Cent. Utah Tel. Ass'n., 657 P.2d 1304, 1306-07 
(Utah 1982). In other words, the grounds for relief under --------\i.i:, 
6o(b)(6) are exclusive of the grounds for relief allowed under 
other subsections. See Russell, 681 P.2d at 1195; Tani, 282 F.3d 
at 1168 & n. 8. Furthermore, relief under rule 6o(b )( 6) is meant 
to be the exception rather than the rule; we have previously held 
that it should be "sparingly invoked" and used "only in unusual 
and exceptional circumstances." Laub, 657 P.2d at 1307-08 
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Pioneer Inv. Servs. 
Co. v. BrunswickAssocs., 507 U.S. 380,393, 113 S.Ct. 1489, 123 
L.Ed.2d 74 (1993) (remarking that under rule 6o(b)(6) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party must show 
"extraordinary circumstances"); Tani, 282 F.3d at 1168 (same). 
In the case of Kell v. State, 2012 UT 25, ,r 14, 285 P .3d 1133, 1137 that 
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while relief under Rule (b )( 6) is to be sparingly invoked by the court only in 
unusual and exceptional circumstances, the Court held: 
,i 14 Mr. Kell did not specify which of rule 6o(b)'s subsections he 
relied upon, but his sole argument was that his postconviction 
attorneys were grossly negligent in representing him and 
provided him ineffective assistance. This claim does not fall 
within any of the five specified subsections of rule 6o(b ). In 
Menzies v. Galetka, we determined that Mr. Menzies' ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim fell under the province of subsection 
(b)(6).11 Following that precedent, we treat Mr. Kell's motion as 
one for relief under subsection (b)(6). Rule 6o(b)(6) imposes a 
temporal restriction, albeit an imprecise one, requiring that the 
motion be brought within a "reasonable time." 
In the case at bar, there can be little dispute that the fact that the State's 
main witness committed perjury does not fit within the (b)(1) mistake, 
(b)(2) newly discovered evidence, or (b)(3) fraud by opposing party reasons 
of Rule 6o(b). Here we have a witness under threat from the police, who 
_,J testifies falsely. Furthermore, there can be little dispute that the motion and 
memorandum, filed a mere 21 days later was "filed within a reasonable 
time" of the discovery of said perjury. The trial court acknowledged the 
timeliness of the filing in finding, 
However, to the extent Petitioner's motion is more properly 
submitted under rule 6o(b)(6), the court concludes the 
motion is timely.' A motion under rule 6o(b )( 6) must be filed 
within a "reasonable time." Petitioner filed the motion only 
three weeks after learning of Ms. Valencia's allegations, which 
is a reasonable time under the rule. (See Ruling and Order on 
Petitioner's motion for Relief from Judgment entered on 
October 16, 2015) 
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In the case of Bish s Sheet Metal Co. v. Luras, 11 Utah 2d 357, 359, 
·····- - -· . - . - ··•· . '<.., 
359 P.2d 21, 22 (1961) the Supreme Court of Utah recognized a due process 
component to Rule 6o(b)([ 6])1 language of "any other reason justifying 
relief from the operation of the judgment." In that case, the court held: 
The aggrieved party under such a showing would be entitled to 
relief from the judgment of the district court under subdivision 
(7) of Rule 6o(b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure even after the 
expiration of three months because relief from a judgment on 
account of a lack of due process of law is not expressly provided forliy such rule. - -- . -..... -- . - . - . .. -.. -•- ··-. 
One of the most troubling portions of the recantation statement by 
Sarah Valencia's the fact that the investigating officers, and apparently the 
prosecution's investigator were told multiple times that Sarah could not see 
the shooter, and yet were told to testify falsely at the trial. The relevant 
portion of Sarah Valencia's statement is as follows: 
8. I told the detectives that I could not see the occupants of the car that I 
coulan-!.t:-see-their faces, but the officer-insisted-that it was Riqo and 
Bubba (Marquis Lucero). I informed the police that he couldn't have 
been Bubba because I didn't see him there that night. 
9. Approximately a month or so after the shooting, I was again 
questioned by the police and I overheard the officers talked about the 
1 Rule 6o(b )(7) of the 1961 Rules of Civil Procedure is identical to the 
current Rule 6o(b}(§). 
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fact that Sabrina was running toward the garage and was shot in the 
chest and therefore there may have been a shooter in the garage area. 
I asked the officers about this fact, and they told me that although the 
CSI and found some bullets there, that they didn't believe that 
happened. I was confused and scared, and therefore I went along with 
v; what the officers told me to say. 
10. I also recall that prior to the trial occurring I was asked to meet 
at the prosecutor's office on 24th and Washington and they showed 
me maps and again told me what to say in trial. Again I was scared 
and worried about my child and therefore went along with what they 
told me to testify about. 
In Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153-54, 92 S. Ct. 763, 766, 
~ .. - 31 L. Ed. 2d 104 (1972). the Supreme.Court.of-the United States held that a 
prosecutor who allows false testimony be introduced at trial even with 
regards to credibility has violated the due process rights of a criminal 
defendant. In that case the court held 
As long ago as Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112, 55 S.Ct. 
340, 342, 79 L.Ed. 791 (1935), this Court made clear that 
deliberate deception of a court and jurors by the presentation 
of known false evidence is incompatible with 'rudimentary 
demands of justice.' This was reaffirmed in Pyle v. Kansas, 317 
U.S. 213, 63 S.Ct. 177, 87 L.Ed. 214 (1942). In Napue v. Illinois, 
360 U.S. 264, 79 S.Ct. 1173, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 (1959), we said, 
'(t)he same result obtains when the State, although not 
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soliciting false evidence, allows it to go uncorrected when it 
appears.' Id., at 269, 79 S.Ct., at 1177. Thereafter Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S., at 87, 83 S.Ct., at 1197, held that 
suppression of material evidence justifies a new trial 
'irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.' 
See American *154 Bar Association, Project on Standards for 
Criminal Justice, Prosecution Function and the Defense 
· ··Functions 3.·11.(a). When the.'reliability of a·given witness may· 
well be determinative of guilt or innocence,' nondisclosure of 
evidence-affecting credibility falls within this general rule. 
Napue, supra, at 269, 79 S.Ct., at 1177. 
Under our unique state constitution, public prosecutors fall under the 
judicial branch of government. (See Constitution of Utah, Article VIII, § 
16). This placement of prosecutors in the judicial branch is appropriate, as 
our law recognizes that prosecutors are ministers ofjustice who must 
steadfastly "eschew all improper tactics." State v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59, ,I 
31, 992 P .2d 951. 
[A prosecuting attorney] is the representative not of an ordinary 
party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to 
govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at 
all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is 
not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As 
such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the 
law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or 
innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor--
--indeed, he-should do so. But, while-he may strike hard blows, he -----
is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to 
refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful 
conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a 
just one. (quoting State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781, 785-86 (Utah 
1992)) 
Id. (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)). 
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'\!!) 
While the petitioner recognizes that there is no direct evidence the 
prosecutor knew the testimony of Sarah Valencia was both coerced and 
false, the fact that the police officers and the prosecutor's investigator 
allowed her to testify as she did triggers the same due process concerns. 
The Supreme Court of Utah and the Supreme Court of the United 
States have both recognized that outrageous governmental misconduct may 
so offend due process of law that the government is '"absolutely barred 
from invoking judicial processes to obtain a conviction."' State v. Colonna, 
766 P.2d 1062, 1065 (Utah 1988), quoting United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 
423, 431-32 (1973). The Colonna court tacitly recognized that extreme 
governmental misconduct that shocks the conscience or is '"repugnant to 
the American criminal justice system"' may violate the Due Process Clauses 
,..:J of the Utah and Federal Constitutions. Colonna, 766 P .2d at 1066, quoting 
Greene v. United States, 454 F.2d 783, 787 (9th Cir. 1971). The United 
States Supreme Court recognized that Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment might be violated by outrageous government misconduct that 
violates "fundamental 'canons of decency and fairness.'" United States v. 
* + 4 + 
Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 737 n.9 (1980). _I~ County of Sacr~mento v. Le71!is, 
523 U.S. 833, 836, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 1711 (1998), the Court held, "In a due 
process challenge to executive action, the threshold question is whether the 
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behavior of the governmental officer is so egregious, so outrageous, that it 
may fairly be said to shock the contemporary conscience." Rochin v. 
CaliforrLia, 342 U.S_. 165, 172-74 (1952), exemplifies w:hen that standard _ 
may be met. The Rochin Court recognized that police conduct in seeking to 
retrieve drugs swallowed by a suspect by squeezing and reaching down his 
throat, and then taking him to a hospital where a tube was forced down his 
throat to deliver an emetic inducing him to vomit the drugs he had 
swallowed, shocked the conscience and violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
Any lawyer's presentation or failure to correct false evidence is 
accurately viewed as a fraud upon the court. See, e.g., Hurst v. Cook, 777 
P.2d 1029, 1036 n.6 (Utah 1989). The prosecution (which would include 
the prosecutor's investigator and by extension the investigating officers) 
clearly may not present evidence or advance arguments lmown to be untrue=-----~ 
or likely to leave false impressions. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 656 P.2d 
450, 454 (Utah 1982) (State duty-bound by law and professional ethics to 
treat defendant fairly and may not assert arguments lmown to be 
inaccurate); Walker v. State, 624 P .2d 687, 691 (Utah 1981) (State's 
reliance on false impressions created by testimony constituted 
prosecutorial misconduct analogous to use of false testimony). Indeed, the 
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knowing use of misleading or false testimony by the prosecution, or the 
failure to correct such testimony, violates a defendant's federal and state 
rights to due process. Accord Evans v. Virginia, 471 U.S. 1025, 1027-28 
(1985); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153 (1972); Napue v. Illinois, 
360 U.S. 264 (1959); Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28, 31-32 (1957). 
Constitutional errors normally cast upon the prosecution the duty to prove 
them harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Genovesi, 909 P.2d 
916, 922 (Utah App. 1995); Torres v. Mullin, 317 F.3d 1145, 1160 (10th Cir. 
2003); United States v. Buchanan, 891 F.2d 1436, 1441 (10th Cir. 1989). A 
conviction obtained by the knowing use of false or misleading evidence is 
fundamentally unfair and must be set aside if there is any reasonable 
likelihood that the evidence could have affected the judgment of the jury. 
E.g.Napue. 
When a prosecution obtains a criminal conviction through a knowing 
presentation or failure to correct false evidence, both the State and Federal 
constitutions are violated. See Utah Const. Art. I, § 7; U.S. Const Amend. 
XIV; State v. Hewitt, 689 P.2d 22, 24 and nn. 1-2 (Utah 1984). Due process 
simply "cannot tolerate a state criminal conviction obtained by the knowing 
use of false evidence." Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1, 7 (1967). The Utah 
Supreme Court has aptly explained: 
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It is an accepted premise in American jurisprudence that any 
conviction obtained by the knowing use of false testimony is 
fundamentally unfair and totally incompatible with "rudimentary 
demands of justice." The proposition is firmly established that a 
conviction obtained through the use of false evidence known to 
be such by representatives of the State, must fall under the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Article I, 
Section 7, of the Utah State Constitution, if there is any 
reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected 
the judgment of the jury. The same result obtains when the State, 
although not soliciting false evidence, allows it to go uncorrected 
when it appears. This standard derives from both the 
prosecutorial misconduct and more importantly the fact that the 
use of false evidence involves a corruption ofthe truth seeking 
· ·· · · · function·ofthetrial process~- · -- · --- ·- - · · ----- · -
In the present case we have situation wherein there is evidence that 
the police threatened one of the Prosecution's main witnesses with the 
taking of her child if she did not testify in accordance with their wishes . 
.. According to the affidavit of Sarah.Valencia, in a meeting with the _____ . __ 
prosecutor's investigator and the police several weeks prior to trial she was 
informed of the same. Actions by the police of this nature would certainly 
invoke the protections of the due process clause of the 14th amendment. 
The failure the prosecution to rein in such actions by the police would 
invoke similar constitutional violations . 
.. The Supreme Court of Utah has r.ecognized not.only the due proc~ss __ 
implications of the police threatening a witness but also recognize the Utah 
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constitutional protections under Article VIII Section 3 which would allow 
due process type actions to be under the prerogative of the Supreme Court 
of Utah. In the case of Gardner v. Galetka, 2007 UT 3, ,I 20, 151 P.3d 968, 
-.d 972-73 the Court ruled it would be appropriate for the court under the Utah 
constitutional provisions to allow a Rule 6o(b) motion to be addressed even 
if it could be potentially barred under some statute of limitation. In that 
J 
.. case the·coiirfheld: 
We noted that "the power to review post-conviction petitions 
'quintessentially ... belongs to the judicial branch of 
government' pursuant to article VIII of the Utah 
Constitution."38 As such, "the legislature may not impose 
restrictions which limit [post-conviction relief] as a judicial rule 
of procedure, except as provided in the constitution."39 We 
concluded, "Our state constitution is designed to prevent the 
unlawful, improper incarceration or execution ofinnc>'cent · 
individuals, and for that reason, we uphold the viability of the 
Hurst 'good cause' exceptions."4° As a result, it is possible for a 
successive post-conviction claim to be procedurally barred 
under the PCRA and yet receive substantive review on its merits 
under our independent "good cause" common law exceptions. 
In State v. Williams, 2012 UT App 119, ,I 4, 276 P.3d 1265, the Utah 
Court of Appeals did apply limitations to posttrial recantation evidence, 
ruling; 
The granting of a new trial based on posttrial recantation 
evidence is appropriate only upon a determination that "the 
substance of the proffered [recantation] testimony" and the 
·"testimony's probable· ·weight" would "make a different result 
probable on retrial." See State v. Loose, 2000 UT 11, ,I 18, 994 
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P .2d 1237 {internal quotation marks omitted}. The credibility of 
the recantation evidence is "an essential component" of this 
... deteimiriatiori~See·state i,~ 'J>irider, 2005· UT'is, ,r 'i'i6, ·114·-P.3d . - - - ·· -· 
551; 
In the case at bar, we have an unusually exceptional circumstance 
which justifies the application of Rule 6o(b )( 6) and the granting of a new 
trial. Here, we have a case in which a 19-year-old individual has been 
sentenced to prison for two consecutive life terms without the possibility of ~ 
parole. Furthermore, this is a case in which there is a high probability that 
the defendant was improperly convicted. On direct appeal, the Supreme 
Court of Utah ruled that there were several errors made by the trial court 
including an improper exclusion of expert testimony that would suggest 
that due to lighting conditions an individual would not be able to see from 
the location of Sarah Valencia any facial features or distinguishing 
appearance of an individual shooting from a vehicle on the roadway. The 
expert generated animations, and the accompanying testimony suggested 
an alternate theory of the shooting. The improper exclusion of expert 
testimony regarding false confessions, and the improper exclusion of other 
testimony and documents presented by the defendant all support of the 
defendants theory that he was not the shooter. The Court concluded that 
these errors were harmless due to the overwhelming evidence of guilt. In 
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relying upon this harmless error theory, the court weighed heavily the 
testimony of Sarah Valencia, who was the only independent eye-witness in 
the case to put the gun in the hand of Riqo Perea. The other witnesses, 
vJ> Angelo Gallegos and Christopher Garcia were both potential defendants 
were never charged as a result of their testimony, and therefore as such had 
some inherent reliability issues. The only other eyewitness put a gun in the 
hand of Riqo Perea was Dominique Duran, but her testimony was likewise 
inherently unreliable based upon the fact that she testified she didn't 
remember much, and that questioning prosecutor's recitation of one of her 
prior three contradictory statements was qualified by a statement as 
follows~· 
,vJ> . .. -· . 
Q. Do you remember during the course of this statement 
Detective John Thomas, who's seated right here in the 
courtroom, coming to you and emphasizing that it was 
important for you to tell the truth? . 
A Yes. He threatened me a lot, yes. 
--Thus, we have a situation wherein the overwhelming evidence -relied upon 
by the Supreme Court of Utah is significantly undermined by the 
recantation by Sarah Valencia for trial testimony. It is the testimony of 
Sarah Valencia-that constituted· the overwhelming evidence relied-upon by·· 
the Utah Supreme Court in denying a new trial. Utilizing the requirement 
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that "[t]he credibility of the recantation evidence is 'an essential 
component' of this determination"2, an analysis of that recantation would 
suggest reliability of the recantation. Here, we see that Ms. Valencia 
originally told the police three times that she could not recognize the 
shooter, and only after coercion did she change that story. Her original 
statements would be supported by the defense expert who said that due to 
lighting conditions .. one would not be able to see sufficiently to recognize an ~ 
individual in the shooter's position. 
Given all of the above, there is a significant likelihood that the 
outcome of the trj.al would be different if the original trial testimony of 
Sarah Valencia is shown to be false. This likelihood would increase even 
more if the original trial court errors excluding significant defense evidence 
.. . ... were rectified.at .the.new trial. 
Arti~le VII! Section 3 of the Ut~ ~011~tution :Qrovides the Supre.Ill~ __ 
Court authority to issue writs and orders to ensure that an individual is not 
unjustly incarcerated. Given the information contained in Sarah Valencia's 
affidavit in which she recants the entirety of her eyewitness identification, 
the conviction of Riqo Perea is seriously called into question. A granting of 
the petitioner's request for new trial would ensure that justice is 
2 State v.-Williams, 2012 UT App 119; ,r 4, 276-P.3d 1265 
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-..a ... 
accomplished, and that Mr. Perea's constitutional rights are adequately 
protected. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the petitioner respectfully requests this 
court to grant relief from judgment in the Post-Conviction Remedies Act 
Petition. In the alternative, the petitioner respectfully requests that the case 
be remanded for an evidentiacy hearing on the Rule 6o(b) motion. 
DATED this 4th day of February 2016. 
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JUSTICE PARRISH, opinion of the Court: 
INTRODUCTION 
11 Rigo Perea appeals from a conviction for two counts of 
aggravated murder in violation of Utah Code section 76-5-202 and 
two counts of attempted murder in violation of Utah Code section 
76-5-203. Mr. Perea was sentenced to life ·without parole (L \VOP) for 
each aggravated murder conviction and three years lo life for each 
attempted murder conviction. 
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i12 Mr. Perea raises numerous issues. He contends that the 
district court erred by limiting and excluding the testimony of 
defense experts, precluding the testimony of potentially exculpatory 
defense witnesses, and denying Mr. Perea' s motion to suppress his 
confession. Mr. Perea further contends that the combination of 
errors constitutes cumulative error and requires reversal. Mr. Perea 
also argues that Utah Code section 76-3-207.7, which provides the 
sentencing scheme for first degree felony aggravated murder, is 
unconstitutional. He finally argues that we should require recording 
of confessions occurring at police stations. 
13 We hold that the district court erred when it excluded the 
testimony of the defense's expert witnesses. But we conclude that 
the error was harmless and does not undermine our confidence in 
the verdict when viewed against the backdrop of Mr. Perea' s 
ovenvhelming guilt. \'Ve also hold that section 76-3-207.7 is constitu-
tional on its face and was constitutionally applied to Mr. Perea. \Ve 
therefore affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
,4 On the evening of August 4, 2007, Mr. Perea, then nineteen 
years old, was spending time with friends. Mr. Perea and many of 
those with him belonged to the Ogden Trece gang. That night, 
Dominique Duran drove the group to the home of Christina Rivera 
in her maroon GMC Yukon (SUV). When the group arrived at 
Ms.Rivera's residence, Sarah Valencia, who had been left in charge 
of the :residence, told the group they were not welcome. 
15 When the group entered Ms. Rivera's house over 
Ms. Valencia's objections, she and a friend walked across the street 
to Anthony Nava's house. Mr. Nava was hosting a wedding party 
that included some members of the Norteftos, a rival gang to the 
Ogden Trece. Before Ms. Valencia and her friend made it to 
Mr. Nava' s house, Mr. Perea and the others followed them and an 
argument erupted. The argument led to an exchange of gang insults 
between Mr. Perea' s group and some party goers at Mr. Nava' s, at 
which point an unknown person fired a shot in the air. 
~ 6 When the shot was fired, Mr. Perea and his group returned 
to Ms. Duran's SUV. Mr. Perea was seated in the front passenger 
seat. Ms. Valencia, who was standing near the street, testified that 
as the SUV pulled away, "I seen Riqo over the top, shooting." 
Similarly, Angelo Gallegos and Elias Garcia, passengers in the SUV, 
testified that Mr. Perea fired shots from the SUV as it pulled away 
from the party. 
2 
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17 iv1s. Valencia and her friend, Sabrina Prieto, were standing 
on a walkway between the front door and the carport of Mr. Nava' s 
house when the shots rang out from the SUV. Ms. Valencia ran east 
along the front of the home toward the carport, and as she sought 
cover in a side door, she turned and saw Ms. Prieto fall on the 
doorstep. Ms. Prieto had been fatal1y shot through the right side of 
her chest. 
,s Richard Esquivel, like many of the other witnesses, was 
facing the road when the shots from the SUV were fired. 
Mr. Esquivel testified that he saw someone from the passenger side 
of the SUV lean over the roof and fire towards Mr. Nava' s house. 
After the first shot was fired, Mr. Esquivel got down but was hit in 
the back part of his shoulder and hip. Rocendo Nevarez, who was 
standing slightly closer to the road, was fatally shot in the lower left 
part of his back. 
~9 Keri Garcia was standing in 1Vlr. Nava' s driveway when the 
shots from the SUV were fired. She ran south along the side of the 
house, but was shot in the lm,ver back as she sought cover. 
Ms. Garcia testified that the shots came only from the direction of the 
road. 
,10 Lacey Randall \.Vas standing beside her car, which was 
parked in 1vlr. Nava's driveway. As did the other wil11esses, 
Ms. Randall testified that she saw the shooter sitting on the passen-
ger side windowsill of the SUV. Ms. Randall was pulled to the 
ground just before a bullet struck the car window above her. 
111 ivfr. Gallegos, a passenger in the SUV, testified that when 
Mr. Perea climbed back into the vehicle after the shootings, 
Mr. Perea told them that "[i]f [they] said anything, there would be 
a bullet with [their] name on it." In contrast, :tvlr. Garcia, another 
passenger, testified that Mr. Perea ''was confused," but ''never 
threatened to put a bullet in anybody." Ms. Duran, who was 
driving, testified that Mr. Perea said," (D]rive right and let's not get 
pulled over." 
~12 A short time later, Ms. Duran dropped off the group near 
a church in North Ogden. Mr. Garcia testified that later that 
morning, Mr. Perea dumped the gun in an alley. The gun was never 
recovered. 
~13 The bullets recovered from Ms. Prieto' sand Mr. Navarez' s 
bodies were .22 caliber and appeared to have been fired from the 
same gun. Police recovered ten expended .22 caliber shell casings in 
., 
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the street in front of Mr. Nava' s house. No other shell casings were 
found at the crime scene. While the State's ballistic expert deter-
mined that all of the casings were expended from the same gun, the 
expert was not able to determine if the gun that fired the bullets was 
the same gun that expended the casings. 
il14 \.Vhile investigating the case, Detective John Thomas called 
Mr. Perea' s cell phone. Detective Thomas explained that he needed 
Mr. Perea "to come into the police station, talk to [him]," and give 
the detective "[Mr. Perea's] version of what happened that night." 
Mr. Perea denied any involvement in the crime and then discon-
nected the call. When Detective Thomas called back, Mr. Perea 
stated that "he wasn't coming in yet, that he needed to speak with 
his lawyer first before he came in," and that "he got screwed the last 
time he spoke with cops and he was innocent." 
i11s Two days later, officers arrested Mr. Perea in Layton. They 
transported Mr. Perea back to Ogden and placed him in an interview 
room. Mr. Perea was allowed to use the bathroom, and when he 
returned, Detective Thomas read Mr. Perea his Miranda rights. 
Detective Thomas joked that Mr. Perea ''had his rights read to him 
so many times that he could probably read them back to [him], and 
[Mr. Perea] kind of laughed and said, 'Yeah, probably."' Officer 
Gent, who was standing outside the interview room, monitored the 
conversation via a closed-circuit television. Despite the fact that the 
closed-circuit television was equipped to do so, Officer Gent did not 
record the interview because it was the Ogden Police Department's 
policy not to record interrogations. 
~16 After providing Mr. Perea with some water, Detective 
Thomas and Officer Gent began their questioning. Mr. Perea agreed 
to speak \vith the investigators and told them his version of the 
events the night of the shootings. Though the investigators told Mr. 
Perea that his story did not match that of other witnesses, the 
conversation remained calm and civil. 
'TI17 During the questioning, the investigators suggested that 
perhaps Mr. Perea fired the shots from the SUV because he was 
trying to protect Ms. Duran's children, who were in the back seat of 
the SUV. And in an attempt "to minimize the consequences of what 
[Mr. Perea] was looking at," Officer Gent suggested to Mr. Perea that 
he intentionally shot low or high, not intending to kill anyone. 
During this part of the questioning, Mr. Perea began to cry and 
though "he was tearing up and his eyes were welling up," Officer 
Gent testified that "it wasn't like [Mr. Perea] \.\'as full grown dis-
4 
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traught." \Vhen further questioned about whether he shot to protect 
the children, Mr. Perea stated that" as they drove off [in the SUV] he 
blacked out and he couldn't remember what happened." 
,I18 The investigators told Mr. Perea that "it doesn't usually 
work out well'' when people say they blacked out, and they 
encouraged Mr. Perea to tell the truth. Mr. Perea thereafter admitted 
to shooting from the SUV. \Vhen asked what kind of gun he fired, 
Mr. Perea stated that it was a .22 caliber, a fact the investigators had 
not previously disclosed. 
if 19 After admitting to the shooting, Nlr. Perea agreed to sign 
a typewritten confession. Officer Gent once again gave Mr. Perea a 
Miranda warning, and Mr. Perea again agreed to speak with the 
officers. Officer Gent then asked Mr. Perea open-ended questions 
about the shooting, to which Mr. Perea gave answers that "seemed 
appropriate for the question." Officer Gent testified that he tran-
scribed l\llr. Perea' s statements u verbatim." 
~po After Officer Gent completed the transcription, he printed 
the document and handed it to Mr. Perea for review. vVhen Officer 
Gent asked Mr. Perea if he could read, ''[Mr. Perea] laughed at [the 
officer] and said he could." Mr. Perea read the statement and signed 
where appropriate, including an acknowledgment that he volun-
tarily waived his lv1iranda rights. Officer Gent testified that he 
"[n]ever saw any indication that [Mr. Perea] was not understanding 
what [the investigators] ·were saying" and that Mr. Perea was 
attentive and responsive throughout the process. Officer Gent 
further testified that he never made any promises to Mr. Perea in 
exchange for his cooperation with the investigators. 
,I21 The State charged Mr. Perea with two counts of aggravated 
murder and two counts of attempted murder. The State initially 
filed, and then withdrew, a notice of intent to seek the death penalty. 
Prior to trial, the district court made three substantive evidentiary 
rulings relevant to the issues raised on appeal. 
Cff22 First, the district court denied the State's motion to exclude 
the testimony of James Gas kilt the defense's crime scene recons truc-
tion expert, who intended to testify that there were multiple shooters 
and that the State's conclusion that Mr. Perea fired all of the shots 
was not supported by the forensic evidence. The State argued that 
Nlr. Gaskill's theories were not supported by the facts and that his 
anticipated testimony constituted an improper expression of opinion 
on the credibility of other witnesses. The district court held that 
Mr .Gaskill could testify regarding his conclusions about the 
5 
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sequence of events on the night of the crime. And while the district 
court ruled that Mr. Gaskill could not comment on the credibility of 
other witnesses, it allowed him to" testify that based on his examina-
tion[,] he [did not] agree with what some of the witnesses testified 
to." 
~23 Minutes before the defense presented its case, the State 
renewed its motion to exclude Mr. Gaskill's testimony. Citing 
foundational concerns, the State objected to the admission of two 
computer animations and a number of photographs Mr. Gaskill 
intended to use in support of his testimony. After hearing testimony 
from Mr. Gaskill in support of the evidentiary foundation, the court 
excluded both animations and the photographic evidence. It ruled 
that the photographs did not accurately depict the crime scene and 
it excluded the animation because "[Mr.] Gaskill can't lay any kind 
of a foundation for the animation here. He didn't prepare it. We 
don't know what went into it. We don't know who was involved in 
[its creation]." Although the court allowed Mr. Gaskill to testify at 
trial regarding his theories, it sustained the majority of the State's 
multiple objections when Mr. Gaski11' s testimony commented 
directly on the credibility of other witnesses. 
,24 The district court's second relevant pretrial ruling involved 
the testimony of Dr. Richard Ofshe, a defense expert who intended 
to testify about the phenomena of false confessions and opine that 
Mr. Perea had falsely confessed. The State argued that under rule 
608 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, Dr. Ofshe could not testify "that 
[Mr. Perea' s] confession was coerced" because "[t]hat is a legal 
conclusion ... [a]nd that is for the [district court] to determine." The 
State also argued that under rule 702, Dr. Ofshe's "research is 
sharply contested ... [and] is not research that is generally accepted 
within the scientific community in which he operates." Finally, the 
State argued that under rule 403, Dr. Ofshe' s testimony would be 
more prejudicial than probative. 
125 The defense responded by noting that the parties were not 
before the court" on a Rimmasch hearing" and argued that the district 
court had "appointed [Dr. Ofshe] as an expert." The defense 
continued, stating that "[w]e're asking that [Dr. Ofshe] be able to 
testify as an expert and ask for some sort of Rimmasch [hearing] that 
could show that he's not reliable,'' otherwise, "I think that it would 
be incumbent upon the Court to allow his testimony." The defense 
argued that Dr. Ofshe had testified in over one hundred cases 
nationwide, that this court had cited to Dr. Ofshe's work in two 
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opinions, 1 and that his expert testimony would assist the jury and 
should therefore be admitted. 
126 The district court reasoned that a jury of lay people could 
determine a confession's voluntariness. It also expressed concern 
that it 
ha[ d] previously ruled that Defendant's confession 
was voluntary. Dr. Ofshe' s proposed testimony that 
Defendant's [confession] was coerced isa legal conclu-
sion previously rejected by the Court and invades the 
fact finding function of the jury .... [Further,] 
Dr. Ofshe's conclusions do not meet the Rimmasch 
standard because they are based upon principles not 
generally accepted within the scientific community. 
The district court did not "allow Dr. Ofshe to testify either in 
generalities about coerced confessions or about the confession in this 
particular case." The district court noted, however, that" the defense 
[could] develop their theory of whether it was a coerced confession 
in the[ir] argument," and it agreed to give a jury instruction 
regarding coerced confessions. 
127 The district court's third relevant pretrial ruling involved 
its decision to bar potential defense witnesses unless the defense 
disclosed their names. The defense argued that anonymity was 
critical because these potentially exculpatory witnesses would not 
come forward, or would change their stories, if their names were 
revealed outside of the courtroom. The State argued that such a 
prohibition would prevent proper investigation of the witnesses' 
stories. The district court ruled that "if these [witnesses] are not 
willing to give their identity to the prosecutors and the law enforce-
ment [to] follow up on what they are going to say, then they are not 
going to testify." After the court's ruling, the defense chose not to 
disclose the names of the potential witnesses and did not call them 
at trial. 
,i2s The jury found Mr. Perea guilty as charged. At the 
sentencing hearing, the district court identified several aggravating 
and mitigating circumstances, and found that "the aggravating 
circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances beyond a 
reasonable doubt." It sentenced Mr. Perea to LWOP for each 
1 See State v. Rettenberger, 1999 UT 80, ~ ~I 22-23, 31, 984 P.2d 1009; 
State v. Mauchley, 2003 UT 10, ~,r 21, 27 n.3, 53-54, 56, 67 P.3d 477. 
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aggravated murder count and three years to life for each attempted 
murder count. I\fr. Perea timely appealed. 
~29 We have jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code section 78A-3-
102(3)(i). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
~30 \Ve review the district court's decision to exclude expert 
witness testimony for an abuse of discretion. Eskelson ex rel. Eskelson 
v. Davis Hosp. [-,, Med. Ctr., 2010 UT 59, ~ 5, 242 P.3d 762; State v. 
Clopte11, 2009 UT 84, , 6, 223 P.3d 1103. The district court has "wide 
discretion in determining the admissibility of expert testimony." 
Staf-e v. Hollen, 2002 UT 35, if 66, 44 P.3d 794 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). Therefore, "we disturb the district court's decision 
to strike expert testimony only when it exceeds the limits of 
reasonability." Eskelson, 2010 UT 59, ~ 5 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). But if the district court errs in its interpretation of the law 
or the application of the law to the facts," it [does] not act within the 
limits of reasonability, and we will not defer to the evidentiary 
decision." Id. 
iJ31 Similarly, we give the district court "broad discretion to 
admit or exclude evidence," including lay witness testimony, 11 and 
will disturb its ruling only for abuse of discretion." Daines v. 
Vincent, 2008 UT 51, ~ 21, 190 P.3d 1269; sec al~o Taylor v. Illinois, 484 
U.S. 400,415 (1988) (affirming the trial court's preclusion of witness 
testimony as a sanction for a discovery violation). 
,32 A district court's "ruling on a motion to suppress is 
reviewed for correctness, including its application of the law to the 
facts." State v. Tripp, 2010 UT 9, ,I 23,227 P.3d 1251. We review the 
district court's factual findings for dear error. Save Our Schools v. Bd. 
c:f Educ., 2005 UT 55, ~ 9, 122 P.3d 611. We will only find clear error 
if the court's factual findings "are not adequately supported by the 
record, resolving all disputes in the evidence in a light most 
favorable to the trial court's determination." Id. (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
i\33 1\fr. Perea' s cumulative error claim requires that vve first 
apply "the standard of review applicable to each underlying claim 
of error." Radman v. Flanders Corp., 2007 UT App 351, ~ 4, 172 P.3d 
668. After assessing Mr. Perea's underlying claims, we will reverse 
"under the cumulative error doctrine only if the cumulative effect of 
the several errors undermines ... confidence that a fair trial was 
had." State v. Killpack, 2008 UT 49, , 54, 191 P.3d 17 (internal 
8 
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quotation marks omitted). But, if Mr. Perea' s claims do not consti-
tute error, or if the cumulative effect of any errors does not under-
mine our confidence in the verdict, we will not apply the doctrine. 
See id. 
134 Mr. Perea' s challenge to his sentence of L WOP involves 
statutory and constitutional interpretation. We therefore review the 
district court's decision "for correctness, and we provide no 
deference to the district court's legal conclusions." State v. Poole, 
2010 UT 25, CU 8, 232 P.3d 519. 
ANALYSIS 
,35 I\,fr. Perea argues that the district court erred in: 
(1) limiting the testimony of the defense's crime scene reconstruction 
expert, (2) excluding the testimony of the defense's false confession 
expert, (3) precluding the testimony of potentially exculpatory 
witnesses, and (4) denying the defense's motion to suppress 
Mr. Perea's confession. Mr. Perea argues that, taken together, these 
errors constituted cumulative error and "effectively den[ied] 
Mr. Perea a fair trial.'' Mr. Perea further argues that his sentence of 
LWOP is unconstitutional. Finally, Mr. Perea urges us to judicially 
require the recording of all station house confessions. 
if 36 We first address each of Mr. Perea' s asserted errors and 
then turn to his cumulative error argument. vVe next discuss 
Mr .Perea' s argument that his sentence of L WOP is unconstitutional. 
Finally, we turn to Mr. Perea's argument that we should judicially 
mandate the recording of station house confessions. 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN LIMITING THE 
TESTIMONY OF JAMES GASKILL 
if37 Mr. Perea argues that the district court erroneously 
excluded the testimony of James Gaskill, the defense expert on crime 
scene reconstruction. Mr. Gaskill visited the scene, took measure-
ments, and determined that there "were multiple shooters[,] ... that 
the bullet casing pattern did not seem consistent with the State's 
version of events, [and] that it would be difficult, if not impossible, 
for [Mr. Perea] to hit the[] victims according to the State's theory." 
While the district court allowed Mr. Gaskill to testify to his investi-
gation and theory, it did not allow him to directly comment on the 
credibility of the State's witnesses, or utilize photographic and 
animated evidence in support of his testimony. 
138 We hold that the district court did not err when it pre-
vented Mr. Gaskill from commenting on the veracity of other 
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witnesses and when it refused to admit his proffered photographs. 
But the district court did abuse its discretion when it refused to 
admit the computer animations in support of Mr. Gaskill' s testi-
mony. 
A. The District Court Did not Err when It Precluded Mr. Gaskill From 
Directly Commenting on the Credibility of the State's Witnesses 
,f 39 "[W]e allow experts latitude to interpret the facts before 
them," even when that interpretation contradicts that of another 
witness. Eskelson ex rel. Eskelson v. Davis Hosp. & lv1ed. Ctr., 2010 UT 
.59, 116,242 P.3d 762. But we do not allow ''an expert's testimony 
as to the truthfulness of a witness on a particular occasion." State v. 
Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388,392 (Utah 1989) (citing rule 608 of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence for the proposition that witnesses may not 
normally testify regarding" specific instances of [ another] witness's 
conduct in order to attack or support the witness's character for 
truthfulness"). Because "the resolution of credibility [is] for the fact 
finder [alone],'' it is not a proper subject on which an expert witness 
may opine. State v. Hoyt, 806 P.2d 204,211 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
,r 40 While our rules of evidence allow Mr. Gaskill to present 
theories that contradicted the testimony of other witnesses, our rules 
do not allow him to comment directly on the veracity of those 
witnesses. See Eskelson, 2010 UT 59, il 17. We therefore hold that the 
district court did not err when it prohibited Mr. Gaskill from 
testifying as to the truthfulness of the State's witnesses. 
B. The District Court Did not Err when It Excluded Mr. Gaskill's 
Crime Scene Photographs 
,I 41 Before evidence may be admitted, its proponent is required 
to establish a proper foundation. Rule 402 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence requires that evidence must be relevant to be admitted. 
Rule 901(a) requires that an exhibit must be authenticated and that 
"the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a 
finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is." Where an 
exhibit is not representative of what its proponent claims it repre-
sents, a court does not abuse its discretion when it refuses to admit 
the exhibit. See State v. Horton, 848 P.2d 708, 714 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993). And even if an exhibit is both relevant and authenticated, rule 
403 allows the district court to O exclude relevant evidence if its 
probative value is substantially ouh-veighed by a danger of one or 
more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, 
misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly 
presenting cumulative evidence." 
10 
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,42 Here, the defense sought to introduce photographs taken 
by Mr. Gaskill that he claimed represented the crime scene. The 
State objected, arguing that the photographs did not accurately 
represent the scene on the night of the shooting. Though the 
photographs were based on actual crime scene photographs, 
Mr. Gaskill admitted that there were many differences between his 
photographs and the scene on the night of the shooting. He 
admitted that the photos purporting to show Mr. Perea' s view from 
the SUV could not be accurate because the appropriate make and 
model SUV was not used. He further admitted that a pickup truck 
in one of the photographs was not the same make or model as the 
truck parked there on the night of the shooting. Finally, Mr. Gaskill 
admitted that he was not certain if a car in one of the photographs 
was in the same location as it had been on the night of the shooting. 
~43 Mr. Gaskill' s admissions create significant doubt as to the 
accuracy and relevance of the photographs. Particularly where the 
defense's theory was contingent on the location and size of the 
vehicles involved, the inaccurate use of substitute vehicles had the 
potential to unfairly prejudice or mislead the jury or to confuse the 
issues. See UTAH R. EVID. 403. Therefore, the district court did not 
abuse its discretion when it refused to admit the inaccurate and 
potentially misleading photographs. 
C. The District Court Erred wizen It Excluded lvlr. Gaskill's 
Computer-Generated Animations 
,I44 The defense attempted to introduce two computer-
generated animations to visually represent Mr. Gaskill's testimony. 
Mr. Gaskill testified that although he did not personally create the 
animations, they ''g[a]ve an indication of what [he] believe[d] may 
have happened" and would make it easier for the jury to understand 
his testimony. The State objected and the district court refused to 
admit the animations, finding that" there [was] no foundation for the 
animation[s]" because Mr. Gaskill did not know "who created 
[them]," "the background of the people who created [them]," "how 
[they were] created," or ''what [the animators] relied upon in 
creating [them]." We hold that the district court applied an errone-
ous legal standard in refusing to admit the animations. 
~45 Broadly speaking, all evidence can be categorized as either 
substantive or demonstrative. See Steven C. Marks, The Admissibility 
and Use of Demonstrative Aids., 32 A.B.A. THE BRIEF 24, 25 (2003). 
Demonstrative evidence is evidence that is meant only to illustrate 
a witness's testimony. Id. It carries no independent probative value 
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in and of itself, but aids a jury in understanding difficult factual 
issues. Id. Common examples of demonstrative evidence include 
models, charts, and tirnelines. 
,r 46 On the other hand, substantive evidence is" offered to help 
establish a fact in issue." BLACK'S LAW DICrJONARY 640 (9th ed. 
2009). In other words, relevant "[substantive] evidence directly 
affects the perceived likelihood that a fact of consequence has 
occurred" whereas the ''effect of demonstrative evidence is to help 
clarify and make more understandable a piece of substantive proof." 
Robert D. Brain & Daniel J. Broderick, The Derivative Relevance uf 
., 
Demonstrative Evidence: Charting Its Proper Evidentiary Status, 25 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 957., 967 (1992). Common examples of substantive 
evidence include eyewitness testimony, ballistic reports, and 
security camera footage. 
if47 Because rule 901(a) of the Utah Rules of Evidence requires 
that "the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a 
finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is/' the 
distinction between substantive and demonstrative evidence is 
critical to understanding the foundational burden imposed on the 
evidence's proponent. If the evidence is merely demonstrative, then 
the proponent claims only that the proffered demonstrative evidence 
accurately illustrates the testimony given and rule 901 is satisfied so 
long as there is sufficient evidence to support the claim that it 
accurately depicts a witness's testimony as well as any uncontested 
relevant facts. 2 Alternatively, in the case of substantive evidence, 
there must be some showing that the evidence itself supports the 
proffered conclusion.3 
~48 Computr:'.r-generated evidence is simply a subset of general 
evidence and the categories of computer-generated evidence 
correspond with the h-vo general categories of evidence. A "com-
2 Prior cases have held that demonstrations and reenactments 
require substantially similar conditions, See, e.g., Whitehead v. Am. 
Motors Sales Corp., 801 P.2d 920, 923 (Utah 1990). This substantial 
similarity requirement is properly applied to the undisputed facts and 
proponent's own testimony. \Ne have never held that such evidence 
must be substantially similar to the opponent's version of disputed 
facts. 
3 The type of support required will vary depending on the nature 
of the substantive evidence. See R. COLLIN MANGRUM & DEE 
BENSON, MANGRUM& BENSON ON UTAH EVIDENCE, 802-23 (2012). 
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puter animation" demonstrates a witness's testimony and is 
therefore a subset of demonstrative evidence. See Kurtis A. Kemper, 
Annotation,AdmissibilityofComputer-GcncratedAnimation, 111 A.LR. 
5th 529 § 2b (2003). As such, the witness does not use the computer 
animation to arrive at his or her conclusions. Rather, the animation 
is wholly illustrative of the witness's own conclusions drawn from 
the underlying substantive evidence. 
,J49 In contrast, a "computer simulation" is substantive 
evidence used by the witness in drawing his conclusions. 
(C]omputer-generated simulations are typically 
recreations of events or experiments based on scien-
tific principles and data; in a simulation, data is 
entered into a computer, which is programmed to 
analyze and draw conclusions from the data. Com-
puter simulations are [therefore a type of] substantive 
evidence offered to support a fact in issue and have 
independent evidentiary value. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). Computer simulations do not just illustrate 
an expert's conclusions but are submitted as substantive evidence 
with independent probative value. As a subset of substantive 
evidence, computer simulations must therefore meet a higher 
threshold showing than that required for demonstrative evidence. 
cif50 Because computer animations are merely a subset of 
demonstrative evidence, it is not necessary that the testifying witness 
know how the animation was created in order to satisfy rule 901's 
authenticity requirement. Rather, it is sufficient that the animation 
accurately reflects the witness's testimony. See, e.g., Gosser v. 
Commonwealth, 31 S.W.3d 897, 903 (Ky. 2000) ("(B]ecause a 
computer-generated diagram, like any diagram, is merely illustra-
tive of a witness's testimony, its admission normally does not 
depend on testimony as to how the diagram was prepared, e.g., how 
the data was gathered or inputted into the computer."), al1rogated on 
other grounds by Eleryv. Commonwealtll, 368S.W.3d 78 (Ky. 2012). For 
instance, an expert witness using a plastic model of a human organ 
is not required to know how the model was created. It is sufficient 
for the expert to confirm that the model accurately represents the 
organ about which he is testifying.4 
4 \Ve recognize, however, that because the" animation represents 
only a re-creation of the proponent's version of the event," it" should 
(continued ... ) 
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~51 Because the animations offered to illustrate Mr. Gaskill's 
testimony were only visual representations of his opinions, the 
evidence was demonstrative in nature. It is uncontested that 
Mr. Gaskill did not know the exact computer processes through 
which the animations were created. But the court had already found 
that Mr. Gaskill's testimony about the events depicted in the 
animations was relevant under rule 401 and it did not exclude the 
testimony or animations based on prejudice under rule 403. 
,s2 The State argues that the animations do not accurately 
represent the facts because, under the State's theory, there was only 
one shooter. But this argument misapprehends the burden for 
admissibility of demonstrative evidence under rule 901. Rule 901 
does not require that the demonsh·ative evidence be uncontroversial, 
but only that it accurately represents what its proponent claims. 
Mr. Gaskill confirmed that the animations accurately represented his 
expert interpretation of the facts. Therefore, the district court erred 
when it did not admit the animations. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN BARRING THE 
TESTIMONY OF DR. OFSHE 
ciJ53 Mr. Perea argues that the district court also erroneously 
excluded the testimony of Dr. Richard Ofshe, a defense expert who 
intended to testify regarding false confessions. The district court 
ruled first that Dr. Ofshe could not testify as to the truthfulness of 
Mr. Perea's confession. lt next questioned whether or not an expert 
was needed to testify to the phenomena of false confessions and 
concluded that "a jury of lay people can decide the question as to 
whether or not a confession is reliable, involuntary, or coerced 
without having an expert testify on that issue."5 Finally, the court 
4(. .. continued) 
in no way be viewed as the absolute truth." Clark v. Cantrell, 529 
S.E.2d 528, 537 (S.C. 2000). And we echo the Supreme Court of 
South Carolina in "encourag[ing] the [district] court to give a 
cautionary instruction" to the jury that it is not the absolute truth 
"and, like all evidence, it may be accepted or rejected in whole or in 
part." Id. 
5 We pause to note the distinction between false and coerced 
confessions. Whether a confession is coerced is a question of law 
that hinges on the manner in which the confession \.Vas obtained. In 
contrast, whether a confession is false is a question of fact that hinges 
(continued ... ) 
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found that Dr. Ofshe' s methods were not "science" and refused to 
allow any of his proffered testimony. 
,I54 Because we find that any error was harmless, we decline 
to consider whether the district court erred when it prohibited 
Dr. Ofshe from directly testifying as to the veracity of Mr. Perea's 
confession. However, we find the district court did err when it 
barred Dr. Ofshe from testifying as to the phenomenon of false 
confessions generally. 
A. Because Any Error Was Harmless, We Decline to Con.sider Whether 
the District Court Erred in Prohil1iting Dr. Ofshe from Testifying as to 
the Veracity of Mr. Perea's Confession 
~ 55 Mr. Perea first argues that the district court erred when it 
ruled that Dr. Ofshe could not opine on the truthfulness of 
Mr. Perea' s confession. The State disagrees. In arguing as to the 
propriety of Dr. Ofshe' s proffered testimony on this point, both 
parties frame their arguments around rule 608 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence, which prohibits testimony as to a witness's truthfulness 
on a particular occasion. See State v. Rimnzasch, 775 P.2d 388, 391 
(Utah 1989). However, by its plain language, rule 608 applies only 
to a witness's character for truthfulness. UTAH R. EVID. 608(a) (" A 
witness's credibility may be attacked or supported by testimony about 
the witness's reputation for having a character for truthfulness or 
untruthfulness .... " (emphasis added)). Because Mr. Perea never 
testified, he was not a wih1ess in this case. Rule 608 is therefore not 
controlling. 
CU 56 Al though rule 608 is not controlling here, it may be that the 
policy behind rule 608 is equally applicable to situations like this 
where a wih1ess offers to testify as to the truthfulness of a non-
testifying defendant's out-of-court statement. Indeed, in Rimnzasch, 
we relied on rule 608 to disallow expert testimony as to the veracity 
of a testifying witness's specific out-of-court statement, recognizing 
the important public policy goal of preventing "trials from being 
turned into contests between what would amount to modern 
oath-helpers who would largely usurp the fact-finding function of 
judge or jury." 775 P.2d at 392. This same public policy goal appears 
to be implicated in the case of a defendant's out-of-court confession 
5(. .. continued) 
on the veracity of the confession. It is both possible to have a 
coerced, but true, confession, or a false confession that was not 
coerced. 
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when the defendant declines to testify. Thus, it may well be that rule 
608' s prohibitions should be extended to apply to the out-of-court 
statements of nontestifying witnesses. However, because the parties 
to this appeal did not brief this issue, and because we conclude that 
any error in refusing to admit Dr. Ofshe' s testimony is ultimately 
harmless, see infra Section V .A.2, we decline to resolve the issue here. 
,I57 Thus, we do not reach the question of whether the district 
court erred when it prohibited Dr. Ofshe from testifying about the 
veracity of Mr. Perea's confession. 
B. The District Court Abused Its Discretion when It Refused to Allow 
Dr. Ofshe to Testify About False Confessions Generally 
158 Mr. Perea argues that juries do not understand the 
phenomenon of false confessions and frequently disregard the 
possibility of a false confession. He also argues that juries do not 
understand the prevalence of false confessions, the aggressive and 
persuasive techniques employed by police to elicit confessions from 
suspects, or other factors that contribute to false confessions. He 
accordingly argues that expert testimony was necessary to assist the 
jury in evaluating the truthfulness of his confession. The State 
responds that the district court was well within its discretion to 
exclude the proposed expert testimony under rules 608(a) and 702(a) 
of the Utah Rules of Evidence because such testimony constituted a 
comment on Mr. Perea's credibility, and because the scientific 
methodology on which Dr. Ofshe relied is unreliable. 
159 Issues relating to the admissibility of expert testimony 
regarding the reliability of confessions are similar to those relating 
to the admissibility of expert testimony regarding the reliability of 
eyewitness identification testimony that we recently examined in 
State v. Clopten, 2009 UT 84, 223 P.3d 1103. We therefore begin by 
reviewing our analysis in that case. 
1. Our Holding in Clopten Ivfade Clear that Cautionary Instructions 
and Cross-Examination Are No Substitute For Expert Testimony 
, 60 In February 2006, Deon Clopten was convicted of first-
degree murder for the shooting of Tony Fuailemaa outside of a 
nightclub in Salt Lake City. Clopten, 2009 UT 84, ,r 2. While 
Mr. Clopten claimed that a man named Freddie VVhite was responsi-
ble for the shooting, several eyewitnesses testified that Mr. Clopten 
was the shooter. Id. Without strong physical or forensic evidence, 
the State relied in large part on the eyewitness testimony to convict 
Mr. Clopten. Id. 
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,I61 At trial, 1Vlr. Clopten sought to introduce an expert in 
eyewitness identification, Dr. David Dodd, to testify regarding 
various factors that affect the accuracy of eyewitness testimony. Id. 
,r 3. These factors included" cross-racial identification, the impact of 
violence and stress during an event, the tendency to focus on a 
weapon" and the "suggestive nature of certain identification 
procedures used by police." Id. The district court refused to admit 
the expert testimony, reasoning that it was unnecessary because 
"potential problems with eyewitness identification could be 
explained using a jury instruction." Id. ,r 4. The court of appeals 
deferred to the district court's judgment and upheld Mr. Clopten' s 
conviction. Id. ,i 5. We granted certiorari to review the question of 
"whether expert testimony regarding the reliability of eyewitness 
identification should be presumed admissible when timely re-
quested." Id. ,r 6. 
,I62 Our analysis in Clopten began with a review of State v. 
Long, in which we concluded that "[a]Ithough research has convinc-
ingly demonstrated the weaknesses inherent in eyewitness identifi-
cation, jurors are, for the most part, unaware of these problems." 
721 P.2d 483., 490 (Utah 1986). In Long, we therefore "abandon[ed] 
our discretionary approach to cautionary jury instructions and 
direct[ed] that ... [district] courts shall give such an instruction 
whenever evewitness identification is a central issue in a case and 
., 
such an instruction is requested by the defense." Id. at 492. 
,I 63 Although it was not our intention in Long to preclude the 
admission of expert testimony regarding the infirmities of eyewit-
ness identifications, that was what frequently occurred in practice. 
Many district courts took the position that a cautionary jury 
instruction entirely resolved the question of the reliability of 
eyewitness identifications, and therefore precluded expert testimony 
on that issue. Clopten, 2009 UT 8L1, ,r 13. We recognized in Clopten 
that "[t]his trend ... is troubling in light of strong empirical research 
suggesting that cautionary instructions are a poor substitute for 
expert testimony." Id. ,I 14. We then noted that the more recent 
empirical evidence had conclusively established that the accuracy of 
eyewitness identification depends upon certain factors. Id. ,r 15. 
Such factors included the race of the accused and the wih1ess, the 
amount of time the accused was in view, lighting conditions, 
distinctiveness of appearance, the use of a disguise, and the presence 
of weapons or other distracting objects. Id. Unfortunately, "juries 
are generally unaware of these deficiencies ... and thus give great 
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weight to eyewitness identifications" even when they are potentially 
unreliable. Id. 
if64 Without expert testimony, a defendant is left with only 
cross-examination and a cautionary jury instruction to convey the 
potential shortcomings of an eyewitness identification. We con-
cluded, however, that "[b]oth of these tools suffer from serious 
shortcomings." Id. fl 16. \Ve noted that cautionary instructions were 
only given when requested by the defense and were considered 
ineffective at educating a jury because they are '' given at the end of 
what might be a long and fatiguing trial ... buried in an overall 
charge by the court" and II instructions may come too late to alter the 
jury's opinion of a witness whose testimony might have been heard 
days before." Id. 1 24 (internal quotation marks omitted). And we 
reasoned that cross-examination, while often able to expose lies or 
half-truths, is far less effective when witnesses are mistaken but 
believe that what they say is true. Even if cross-examination could 
expose the mistake, 11 [w]ithout the assistance of expert testimony, a 
jury may have difficulty assessing the import of those factors in 
gauging the reliability of the identification." Id. ,I 22. 
165 On the other hand, we concluded that expert testimony 
"substantially enhance[s] the ability of juries to recognize potential 
problems with eyewitness testimony." Id. 1 25. And although the 
actual number of wrongful convictions from mistaken eyewitness 
identifications is unknown, ttte. possibility of such a wrongful 
conviction provided sufficient justification for us to review the 
implications of our decision in Long. Id. ,r 16 n.7. 
, 66 Because we found that the empirical research regarding the 
limitations of eyewitness identification had matured since our 
decision in Long, we held in Clopten that expert testimony regarding 
eyewitness identifications should be admitted as long as it met the 
standards set out in rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. Id. ,I 32. 
Our expectation was that the "application of rule 702 will result in 
the liberal and routine admission of eyewitness expert testimony." 
Id. ,r 30. Although we cautioned that the admission of eyewitness 
testimonv is not mandatorv, we warned that "the testimonv of an 
.I .,., J 
eyewitness expert should not be considered cumulative or duplica-
tive of cautionary instructions to the jury." Id. ,r,r 33-34. 
,67 We then applied our holding to the facts in Clopten. \Ve 
noted that the witnesses II saw the shooter for no more than a few 
seconds, from some distance away, at night, and while in extreme 
fear for their own lives"; the shooter's face was disguised; the 
18 
Cite as: 2013 UT 68 
JUSTICE PARRISH, opinion of the Court 
shooter was a different race than the witnesses; and the weapon 
used in the murder may have distracted the witnesses. Id.~ 46. We 
concluded that "the circumstances found in the Clop ten trial are 
exactly those under which the testimony of an eyewitness expert is 
most helpful to a jury." Id. ii 47. \/Ve overruled the court of appeals, 
vacated the verdict, and remanded for a new trial because there was 
a "reasonable likelihood that, if allowed to hear Dr. Dodd's testi-
mony, the jury would have questioned the accuracy of the eyewit-
nesses more rigorously and would not have convicted Clopten." Id. 
iJ 48. 
2. Our Reasoning in Cloplen Is Directly Applicable to the Use of 
Expert Testimony with Regard to the Phenomenon of False 
Confessions 
~68 This case presents issues closely paralleling those we 
decided in Clopton. A confession, much like an eyewitness identifi-
cation, is more or less reliable based on a number of factors. 
Unfortunately, however, research has shown that the potential 
infirmities of confessions are largely unknown to jurors." 
i!69 False confessions are an unsettling and unfortunate reality 
of our criminal justice system. Just as the criminal law is "rife with 
instances of mistaken identification," Long, 721 P.2d at 491 (internal 
quotation marks omitted), "[i]t is beyond dispute that some people 
falsely confess to committing a crime that was never committed or 
was committed by someone else". State v. 1\1auchley, 2003 UT 10, 
,i 21, 67 P.3d 477. And like expert testimony regarding eyewitness 
identification, expert testimony about factors leading to a false 
confession assists a "trier of fact to understand the evidence or to 
determine a fact in issue." UTAH R. Evm. 702(a). 
C\j70 Recent laboratory-based studies have identified several 
factors that increase the likelihood of false confessions.7 Among the 
factors identified are sleep deprivation, the presentation of false 
'' Our analogy to Clopton is limited to a recognition that fact 
finders can benefit from expert testimony relating to counterintuitive 
phenomena that are dependent on numerous inter-related factors. 
We make no judgment as to the relative merits of the studies rel a ting 
to eyewitness identification versus those related to the prevalence of 
false confessions. 
7 These studies are discussed in greater detail below. See infra 
Section II.B.3. 
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evidence and use of minimization techniques by questioners, the 
subject's age and intelligence level, and certain personality traits. 
Though expert testimony regarding the phenomenon of false 
confessions would not be appropriate in every case, when such 
indicia are present, a defendant should be allowed to present expert 
testimony on the subject. 
,n Importantly, the shortcomings in the use of cautionary 
instructions and cross-examination in lieu of expert testimony are 
even more acute when dealing with potentially false confessions 
than when <leafing with potentially mistaken identifications. Cross-
examination of eyewitnesses is routine in all cases. Conversely, the 
ability to examine the defendant is only possible if he waives his 
Fifth Amendment protections and testifies in his own case - a 
situation that is far from routine. To require a defendant to testify 
regarding the factors that contributed to his alleged false confession, 
rather than allow the use of an expert witness, opens the defendant 
up to cross-examination and impinges on his constitutionally 
guaranteed right against self-incrimination. For these reasons, 
expert testimony regarding the phenomenon of false confessions 
should be admitted so long as it meets the standards set out in rule 
702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence and it is relevant to the facts of the 
specific case. 
3. Dr. Ofshe's Testimony Satisfied the Requirements for 
Admissibility Under Rule 702 
,12 The two-part analysis articulated by rule 702 of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence governs the admissibility of expert witness 
testimony. "First, the trial judge must find that the expert testimony 
,vill 'assist the trier of fact."' Clopten, 2009 UT 84, if 31 (quoting 
UTAH R. EVID. 702(a)). Second, the party wishing to rely on the 
expert's testimony must make a threshold showing that "the 
principles or methods that are underlying in the testimony (1) are 
reliable, (2) are based upon sufficient facts or data, and (3) have been 
reliably applied to the facts." UTAH R. EVID. 702(b). We therefore 
analyze Dr. Ofshe's proffered testimony under these requirements. 
a. Dr. Ofshe's proposed testimony would have enabled the _jury 
to evaluate Mr. Perea' s claim that he falsely confessed 
iJ73 Under rule 702(a), proposed expert testimony must" assist 
the trier of fact." UTAH R. EVID. 702(a). Here, there is no question 
that Dr. Ofshe's proposed testimony would have assisted the jury in 
evaluating the reliability of Mr. Perea's confession. Testimony 
regarding the factors that can lead to false confessions is exactly the 
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type of evidence that would have helped the jury assess Mr. Perea's 
claim that he falsely confessed. Such testimony aids a _jury in 
reaching a just verdict because it puts a jury on guard to protect 
against giving disproportionate weight to confessions where 
multiple indicia of false confessions are present. In other instances, 
however, such expert testimony may embolden juries to give more 
weight to confessions where no such factors are present. 
b. The science underlying Dr. Ofshe' s proffered testimony is 
sufficiently developed to satisfy rule 702 
174 Rule 702 next requires that proposed expert testimony be 
supported by reliable scientific study and methodology. UTAH R. 
EVID. 702(b). Rule 702 11 assigns to h·ial judges a 'gatekeeper' 
responsibility to screen out unreliable expert testimony" and 
cautions that "trial judges should confront proposed expert testi-
mony with rational skepticism." UTAH R. Evro. 702 advisory 
committee's note. But this '' threshold showing" requires "only a 
basic foundational showing of indicia of reliability for the testimony 
to be admissible, not that the opinion is indisputably correct." Id. 
175 Although a science in its infancy may not meet the 
reliability standards of rule 702, as it matures, the science may 
become sufficiently reliable to meet the "basic foundational showing 
of indicia of reliability for the testimony to be admissible." Id. And 
that is what has happened to the science relating to false confessions. 
In the 1990s, little research had been conducted on the phenomenon 
of false confessions and many of the theories relating to it were not 
sufficiently supported. But more contemporary, laboratory-based 
studies have since been performed and demonstrate that the science 
surrounding false confessions now meets the reliability standards of 
rule 702. 
,76 The State argues that Dr. Ofshe has no reliable scientific 
evidence to support his conclusions about the factors that influence 
the rate of false confessions.8 It argues that Dr. Ofshe's "work is 
8 The State additionally argues that "[s]ince Dr. Ofshe and his 
allies have not been able to determine the rate at which false 
confessions occur, a fortiori, they have not been able to determine the 
rate at which any particular feature they identify as a component of 
a false confession is associated with a false confession.'' The State's 
logic is mathematically flawed, hovvever, because it is entirely 
possible to know that a factor increases, decreases, or has no effect 
(continued ... ) 
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predicated upon individual case studies of alleged false 
confession[s]" rather than empirical evidence or laboratory research. 
The State therefore contends that the defense cannot show that 
Dr. Ofshe's "principles or methods" were "based upon sufficient 
facts or data." 
177 In support of its argument, the State principally relies cm 
Professor Paul Cassell's article, The Guilty and the "Innocent": An 
Examination of Alleged Cases of Wrongful Conviction from False 
Confessions, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 523 (1999). The district court 
agreed with the State, concluding Dr. Ofshe' s proposed testimony 
did not satisfy rule 702(b) because the false confession cases relied 
upon by Dr. Ofshe "are not uniformly accepted within the scientific 
community as being valid false confession cases," and "[t]here is no 
empirical data or credible research that supports Dr. Ofshe's 
opinions regarding false confessions." The district court also 
explicitly stated that Professor Cassell was "more reliable" than 
Dr. Ofshe.9 
,r78 Professor Cassell' s article criticizes the lack of empirical 
evidence in Dr. Ofshe' s two original articles. But it does not speak 
to the wealth of studies generated in the intervening years that the 
8( ... continued) 
on the underlying rate of false confessions without knowing the 
underlying rate itself. A common sense example is that it is possible 
to know that a car speeds up when the driver steps on the accelera-
tor even if the exact starting or ending speeds are unknown. 
Therefore it is mathematica1ly incorrect to say that nothing can be 
known about the way factors influence the likelihood of a false 
confession without knowing the underlying rate of false confessions. 
9 The district court went beyond the mandate of its gatekeeping 
role when it engaged in such weighing of competing expert 
testimony. A district court does not abuse its discretion when it 
concludes that expert testimony does not have sufficient founda-
tional support under rule 702- and this conclusion may be based, in 
part, on a lack of consensus in the field. But a court exceeds its role 
when it bars expert testimony because it prefers one theory or 
researcher over another. An expert either meets or fails the stan-
dards under the rules of evidence. So-called "dueling experts" are 
a standard feature of trials in which expert testimony is presented. 
Rule 702 does not prohibit the admission of two reliable experts who 
draw opposite conclusions based on the underlying evidence. 
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defense presented to the district court. Dr. Ofshe' s report states that 
his testimony not only relies on his original two articles, but also on 
several more recent articles which, in turn, cite to numerous studies 
performed by many other researchers. 10 These studies are based on 
empirical data and laboratory research indicating that such factors 
as sleep deprivation, presentation of false evidence, minimization 
techniques, age, intelligence level, and personality traits all affect the 
rate of false confessions.11 This development of the science of false 
confessions is substantially similar to the development of the science 
of eyewitness identifications we considered in Clopte11. 
179 \!Vhile a comprehensive review of the relevant studies is 
beyond the scope of this opinion, a few of the most important 
studies will be set forth here. For example, controlled laboratory 
experiments have proven that sleep deprivation, which may be 
present in prolonged interrogations, can increase susceptibility to 
influence and has been shown to increase the rate of false confes-
sions. Saul M. Kassin et al., Police-Induced Confessions: Risk Factors 
and Recommendations, 34 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 3, 16 (2010). "[S]leep 
deprivation markedly impairs the ability to sustain attention, 
flexibility of thinking, and suggestibility in response to leading 
questions." Id.; see also, !vlark Blagrove, Effects of Length of Sleep 
Deprivation 011 Interrogative Suggestibility, 2 J. EXPERIMENTAL 
PSYCHOL.:APPLJED48 (1996); Yvonne Harrison &James A. Horn, The 
Impact of Sleep Deprivation 011 Decision Making: A Review, 6 J. EXPERI-
MENTALPSYCHOL.: APPLIED 236 (2000). 
180 Presentation of false evidence is another factor that has 
been shown to increase the rate of false confessions. Numerous 
rn Specifically, his report states: "There are several more recent 
literature reviews which report research on which I also rely. These 
reviews include The Psychology of Interrogation and Confessions -
Gudjonsson, John Wiley, New York 2003; The Psychology of Confes-
sions - Kassin and Gudjonsson in Psychological Science in the Public 
Interest, 5, 2004, The Road to Perdition: Extrcl//e Influence Tactics in the 
Interrogation Room, D. Davis and W O'Donahue in O'Donahue and 
Hollin (eds.), Ha11dl1ook of Forensic Psychology, New York, Basic 
Books, 2004." 
11 For a list of the independent studies corroborating the existence 
of these factors see Saul M. Kassin et al., Police-Induced Confessions: 
Risk Factors and Reco111111c11datio11s., 34 LAvV & Hu:vt BEHAV. 3, 14-22 
(2010). 
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studies have demonstrated that the presentation of false evidence 
renders individuals more vulnerable to manipulation. Kassin et al., 
Police-Induced Confessions, supra, at 14. These studies reveal that the 
presentation of false information through confederates, witnesses, 
counterfeit test results, and false physiological feedback can alter the 
test subjects' visual judgments, 12 beliefs,13 perceptions of other 
people.,1'• behaviors towards other people,15 emotional states,16 self-
assessments,17 and memories for observed and experienced events.18 
Additionally, laboratory experiments have confirmed that the 
presentation of false evidence can increase the probability that an 
innocent person confesses. 
is1 In one study, college students were falsely accused of 
pressing a key on a computer, causing it to crash, after they were 
instructed to avoid the key. See Saul M. Kassin & Katherine L. 
Kiechet Tlze Social Psychology of False Confessions: Compliance, 
12 E.g., Solomon E. Asch, Studies of Independence and Conformity: A 
Minority of One Against a Unanimous J\1a_jority, 70 PSYCHOL. MONO-
GRAPHS: GEN & APPLIED 1 (1956); MUZAFERSHERIF, THE PSYCHOLOGY 
OFSOCJALNORMS (1936). 
13 Craig A. Anderson et al., Per~evercmce of Social Theories: The Role of 
Explanal'ion in the Persistence of Discredited Infonnation, 39 
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1037 (1980). 
14 Henri Tajfel et al., Social Caf-egorization and Intergroup Belzaviour, 
1 EURO. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 149 (1971). 
15 ROBERT ROSENTHAL & LENORE JACOBSON, PYGMALION IN THE 
CLASSROOM: TEACHER EXPECTATION AND PUPILS' INTELLECTUAL 
DEVELOPMENT (1968). 
16 Stanley Schachter & Jerome E. Singer, Cognitive, Social, and 
Physiological Determinants of Emotional State, 69 PSYCHOL. REV. 379 
(1962). 
17 Jennifer Crocker et al., Social Stigma: The Affective Consequences of 
Attributional Ambiguity, 60 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 218 
(1991). 
18 Elizabeth F. Loftus, Planting Misinformation in the Human Mind: A 
30-year Investigation of the MalleabilihJ of Memory, 12 LEARNING 
& MEMORY 361(2005). 
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Internalization, and Confabulation, 7 PSYCHOL. SCI. 125 (1996). 
Despite their innocence and initial denials, sub:jects 
were asked to sign a confession. In some sessions but 
not others, a confederate said she witnessed the 
subject hit the forbidden key. This false evidence 
nearly doubled the number of students who signed a 
written confession, from 48 % to 94 % . 
Kassin et al., Police-Induced Confessions, supra, at 17. Similar studies 
have replicated this experiment and found similar results even when 
the subject's confession led to detrimental financial or other 
consequences. See,. e.g., Robert Horselenberg et al., Individual 
Dtfferences and False Confessions: A Conceptual Replication of Kassin and 
Kiechel, 9 PSYCHOL., CRIME & L. 1 (2003); Allison D. Redlich & Gail S. 
Goodman, Taking Re~ponsibility for an Act Not Committed: The 
Influence of Age and Suggestibility, 27 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 141 (2003). 
The false confession rate in similar experiments was particularly 
acute among children and juveniles. See, e.g., Ingrid Candel et al., "I 
Hit the Shift-Key and Then the Computer Crashed": Children and False 
Admissions, 38 PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 1381 (2005). 
,s2 Minimization techniques used by police officers have also 
been shown to increase the rate of false confessions. Using the 
results from the experiment described above, it was found that 
remarks that minimized the subjects' culpability significantly 
increased the false confession rate. Jessica R. Klaver et al., E/fects of 
Personality, Interrogation Techniques and Plausibility in an Experimental 
False Confession Paradigm, 13 LEGAL&CRIMINOLOGICALPSYCHOL. 71 
(2008). In another study, the test subjects were paired with a 
confederate and given problem solving tasks. Melissa B. Russano et 
al., Investigating True and False Confessions Within a Novel Experimental 
Paradigm, 16 PSYCHOL. SCI. 481 (2005). They were instructed to work 
together on some problems and alone on others. Id. By design, 
some of the confederates sought help on a problem that was 
supposed to be solved alone while others did not. Id. at 483. The 
experimenter would then claim to find similarities in their answers 
and accuse the subject of cheating. Id. When the accusation was 
accompanied by minimization techniques, the rate of false confes-
sions tripled. Id. 
,183 Paradoxically, anecdotal evidence suggests that a defen-
dant's actual innocence may actually increase an individual's 
susceptibility to manipulation. Kassin et al., Police-lnduced Con_fes-
sions, supra, at 22-23. The innocent are often more likely to waive 
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their rights, believing that since they did nothing wrong, they have 
nothing to hide. Id. at 23. This c~mports with the commonplace, but 
naive, notion that only the guilty are accused of crimes and only the 
guilty need attorneys. Id. 
if84 We detail these studies not to endorse a particular position 
on the false confessions literature, but rather to emphasize the 
proper role of courts as gatekeepers under the rules of evidence. The 
aforementioned factors and studies are but a portion of the scientifi-
cally reliable information on risk factors of false confessions. And 
the defense presented this information to the district court, either 
directly through Dr. Ofshe' s proposed testimony or through the 
various articles on which Dr. Ofshe based his intended testimony. 
Rule 702(b)(2) requires that the district court consider all the relevant 
indicia of reliability in determining whether a threshold showing has 
been made. UTAH R. EVID. 702 advisory committee note. Therefore, 
even if Dr. Ofshe' s original two articles lacked the requisite founda-
tion of "sufficient facts or data," the district court could only 
properly exclude Dr. Ofshe's testimony if it concluded that all the 
other studies on which the testimony is based also lacked 11 sufficient 
facts or data." UTAH. R. EVID. 702(b)(2). At a minimum, the science 
behind these studies of false confessions is sufficiently developed to 
meet the threshold of admissibility. 
,-J85 The district court abused its discretion when it evaluated 
only the reliability of Dr. Of she's hvo articles and failed to consider 
the dozens of other studies on which his testimony relied. Just as the 
science regarding eyewitness identifications has sufficiently matured 
to allow its routine introduction after Clopten, so too has the science 
regarding false confessions. 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR WHEN IT REFUSED 
TO ALLOW POTENTIAL DEFENSE vVITNESSES TO TESTIFY 
,I86 Prior to trial, the district court ruled that if the defense was 
unwilling to provide the State with the names of potentially 
exculpatory witnesses, the court would not allow those witnesses to 
testify. I\llr. Perea argues that the district court's decision" deprived 
[him] of an opportunity to present crucial evidence in his defense." 
The State counters that because" the prosecution, the [district] court, 
and the public have a vita] interest in the integrity of the trial 
process," the court's decision to make the testimony conditional on 
the disclosure of the witnesses' names was within the discretion 
granted to the district court. 
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il87 iv1r. Perea argues that the Compulsory Process Clause of 
the Sixth Amendment grants defendants the right to call favorable 
witnesses, particularly when those witnesses are "material and 
favorable to his defense." United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 
858,867 (1982). VVhile a defendant's right to call favorable witnesses 
is a "fundamental element of due process of law," Washington v. 
Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967), 11 [t]he right to present defense 
witnesses ... is not absolute," United States v. Russell, 109 F.3d 1503, 
1509 (10th Cir. 1997). For instance, in Taylor v. Illinois, the U.S. 
Supreme Court affirmed a district court's exclusion of a potentially 
exculpatory defense witness based on the defense's discovery 
violation. 484 U.S. 400,418 (1988). The Court began by stating that 
"[t]he accused does not have an unfettered right to offer testimony 
that is incompetent, privileged, or otherwise inadmissible under 
standard rules of evidence.'' Id. at 410. The Court continued, 
stating: 
The defendant's right to compulsory process is itself 
designed to ... [ensure that] judgments [are not] 
founded on a partial or speculative presentation of the 
facts. Rules that provide for pretrial discovery of an 
opponent's witnesses serve the same high purpose ... 
[and] minimize[] the risk that a judgment will be 
predicated on incomplete, misleading, or even deliber-
ately fabricated testimony. 
Id. at411-12 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court's ruling 
makes clear that a district court's decision to ;'[e]xclud[e] witnesses 
for failure to comply with discovery orders, if not an abuse of 
discretion, does not violate a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to 
compulsory process." Russell, 109 F.3d at 1509. 
,ss Under rule 16(c) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
" [ e ]xcept as otherwise provided or as privileged, the defense shall 
disclose to the prosecutor such information ... [or] item of evidence 
which the court determines on good cause shown should be made 
available to the prosecutor in order for the prosecutor to adequately 
prepare his case." Because district courts must manage discovery in 
such a way as to prevent unfair prejudice to either party, they do not 
abuse their discretion when they exclude witnesses based on a 
party's failure or refusal to disclose a witness's identity. For 
instance, in State v. lv1aestas our court of appeals held that the district 
court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded an alibi witness 
because the defense had failed to timely notify the prosecution of the 
witness. 815 P.2d 1319, 1325 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). The court 
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reasoned that disclosure" prevents last minute surprises and enables 
the prosecution to make a full and thorough investigation of the 
merits of the defense.'' Id. 
i189 Here, the district court acknowledged concerns regarding 
potential retaliation against the defense witnesses, and it left open 
the possibility that it would allow the witnesses to testify under an 
assumed name or undertake similar protective measures. But, 
emphasizing its duty "to [ensure] a fair trial," and concluding that 
the potential witnesses were both relevant and material to 
Mr. Perea' s defense, the district court determined that fairness 
afforded the State an opportunity to fully investigate the witnesses' 
stories. Such a decision is not an abuse of discretion when it 
"prevents last minute surprises and enables the prosecution to make 
a full and thorough investigation of the merits of the defense.'' Id. 
We therefore hold that the district court did not err when it excluded 
the potential defense witnesses. 
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR WHEN IT DENIED 
MR. PEREA'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS HIS CONFESSION 
'if 90 Mr. Perea next argues that his confession should have been 
suppressed for a Miranda violation. Specifically, Mr. Perea argues 
that his statement" that he needed to speak with a lawyer first before 
he came in" was sufficient to anticipatorily invoke his right to 
counsel. The State argues first that a defendant cannot anticipatorily 
invoke his right to counsel prior to a custodial interrogation. It next 
argues that even if an anticipatory invocation of the right is proper, 
Mr. Perea' s statements do not constitute a proper invocation of that 
right. We agree with the State and therefore hold that the district 
court did not err when it denied Mr. Perea' s motion to suppress his 
confession. 
,I91 The U.S. Supreme Court's landmark decision inMirandav. 
Arizona prevents the use of incriminating statements "stemming 
from custodial interrogation of [a] defendant" unless certain 
procedural safeguards are met. 384 U.S. 436,444 (1966). Therefore, 
11 [p ]rior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he 
has ... a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or 
appointed ... [ and if] he indicates in any manner and at any stage of 
the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before 
speaking there can be no questioning." Id. at 444-45. In Edwards v. 
Arizona, the Court expanded the scope of Miranda and held that once 
a custodial suspect has "expressed his desire to deal with the police 
only through counsel," he cannot be" subject to further interrogation 
28 
Cite as: 2013 UT 68 
JUSTICE PARRISH, opinion of the Court 
by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, 
unless the accused himself initiates further communication, ex-
changes, or conversations with the police." 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 
(1981). 
4f[92 Although the Court has not ruled directly on the issue 
before us, a footnote in McNeil 'V. Wisconsin suggests that the Court 
would not allow a defendant to anticipatorily invoke his right to 
counsel. 501 U.S. 171 (1991). The Court stated that while it has 
never held that a person can invoke his Miranda rights 
anticipatorily, in a context other than" custodial inter-
rogation" . . . [t]he fact that we have allowed the 
Niiranda right to counsel, once asserted, to be effective 
with respect to future custodial interrogation does not 
necessarily mean that we will allow it to be asserted 
initially outside the context of custodial interrogation, 
with similar future effect. 
Id. at 182 n.3 (citations omitted). Moreover, the Court has repeatedly 
clarified that a suspect' s A1iranda rights are contingent on his being 
subject to a custodial interrogation. See, e.g., Illinois v. Perkins, 496 
U.S. 292, 297 (1990) (stating that lv1iranda is premised on "the 
interaction of custody and official interrogation"); Rhode Island v. 
Innis, 446 U.S. 291,299 (1980) (""The concern of the Court in Miranda 
was that the interrogation environment created by the interplay of 
interrogation and custody would subjugate the individual to the w:ill 
of his examiner and thereby undermine the privilege against 
compulsory self-incrimination." (internal quotation marks omitted)); 
Oregon v. lviathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 494 (1977) ("Our decision in 
A1iranda set forth rules of police procedure applicable to custodial 
interrogation." (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
193 Similarly, this court has stated that the procedural 
safeguards of lv1iranda apply only when a defendant is in custody. 
In State v. Shuman, we stated that "lviiranda warnings are required 
only where a person has been taken into custody or otherwise 
deprived of his freedom in a significant way." 639 P.2d 155, 157 
(Utah 1981). And in State v. Cruz, we stated that "the Fifth Amend-
ment right to counsel attaches during custodial interrogation, or 
questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has 
been taken into custody or othenvise deprived of his freedom of 
action in any significant way." 2005 UT 45, ~ 43, 122 P.3d 543 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
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,-J94 Here, Mr. Perea's statement "that he needed to speak with 
a lawyer first before he came in" occurred two days before Mr. Perea 
was arrested. When he was arrested, police read Ivlr. Perea his 
l\-1iranda rights, which he then waived. Prior to his interrogation, he 
was again advised of his Miranda rights, and he once again waived 
those rights. Mr. Perea was once again advised of his NI.iranda rights 
when he signed the confession and he acknowledged in writing that 
he was aware of the waiver of his rights. 
,I95 Assuming, without deciding, that Mr. Perea's statement 
two days before his arrest constitutes a request for a lawyer's 
assistance, such a prospective request would still be subject to 
waiver. Had Mr. Perea made the same statement at any point 
during his custodial interrogation, our decision may be different. 
But that was not the case. And once he was taken into custody, Mr. 
Perea waived his rights to the assistance of counsel when he 
consented to the investigators' questioning and confessed to the 
shootings. · 
if 96 Because ~fr. Perea was advised of and subsequently 
waived his lv1iranda rights, the district court did not err when it 
denied Mr. Perea's motion to suppress his confession. 
V. BASED ON THE OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE OF MR. 
PEREA'S GUILT, WE HOLD THAT THE DISTRICT COURT'S 
ERRORS WERE HARMLESS AND THAT THE CUMULATIVE 
ERROR DOCTRINE DOES NOT APPLY 
197 Even if the district court did err, we will not reverse if that 
error was harmless. See State v. Vargas, 2001 UT 5, ,I 48, 20 P.3d 271. 
"In order to show that the error is harmful, [Mr. Perea] must 
demonstrate that absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of 
a more favorable outcome for [him], or phrased differently, our 
confidence in the verdict is undermined." State v. A1edina-Juarcz, 
2001 UT 79, 1 18, 34 P.3d 187 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Similarly, the doctrine of cumulative error is applicable" only if the 
cumulative effect of the several errors undermines ... confidence 
that a fair trial was had." State v. Gallegos, 2009 UT 42, ,r 39,220 P.3d 
136. It is a doctrine used when a single error may not constitute 
grounds for reversal, but mant errors, when taken collectively, 
nonetheless undermine confidence in the fairness of a trial. 
A. Individually, the District Court's Errors Are Harmless 
,98 \Ne have concluded that the district court erred when it 
limited the testimony of Mr. Gaskill and chose not to admit the 
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proposed testimony of Dr. Of she. But the potential harm of each 
error must be viewed against the backdrop of the entire body of 
evidence. And when so viewed, the errors were harmless. 
,99 There was significant testimony from witnesses both 
inside and outside of the SUV stating that Mr. Perea was the 
individual who fired shots into the crowd at Mr. Nava' s house. 
Angelo Gallegos and Elias Garcia, both passengers in the SUV and 
friends of Mr. Perea, testified that Mr. Perea fired shots from the 
SUV as it pulled away from the party. Similarly, Ms. Valencia, who 
was standing near the street and knew Mr. Perea, testified that as the 
SUV pulled away, "I seen [him] over the top, shooting." Two other 
party guests, Richard Esquivel and Lacey Randall, testified that they 
saw someone from the passenger side of the SUV lean over the roof 
and fire towards 1v1r. Nava' s house. And Keri Garcia, who was 
standing in Mr. Nava' s driveway when the shots from the SUV were 
fired, testified that the shots came only from the direction of the 
road. 
~100 Additionally, during questioning, Mr. Perea volunteered 
that the gun he had used was .22 caliber, a fact that the police had 
not shared with the public. Although the murder weapon was not 
recovered, police investigators recovered ten expended .22 caliber 
shell casings in the street in front of Mr. Nava' s house, all fired from 
the same weapon. Likewise, the bullets from 1v1s. Prieto' s and 
Mr. Navarez' s bodies were .22 caliber. No other shell casings were 
found at the crime scene. 
1. The District Court's Exclusion of Mr. Gaskill's Animations Was 
Harmless 
,I101 ½bile the district court excluded rvfr. Gaskill' s computer-
generated animations, it did not exclude his expert testimony on 
which the animations were based. It allowed him to opine as to his 
theory that there were multiple shooters and that the location of 
some of the injuries made it unlikely that 1v1r. Perea could have made 
the shots. He was allowed to ref er to diagrams depicting the scene 
and demonstrate the bullet trajectories that gave him concern. And 
although Mr. GaskiW s theories conflicted with the State's theory and 
the testimony of many of the State's witnesses, the district court 
appropriately allowed him to present his theory to the jury. 
,I102 After having reviewed both the testimony provided by 
Mr. Gaskill and his proffered animations, we hold that the exclusion 
of the animations does not create the "reasonable likelihood of a 
more favorable outcome for the appellant." 1v1edin.a-Juarez, 2001 UT 
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79, ,r 18 (internal quotation marks omitted). The animations were 
short, provided nothing that Mr. Gaskill did not make clear in his 
testimony, and used a perspective that was unhelpful in putting 
Mr. Gaskill' s testimony in context. Because J\-1r. Gaskill was allowed 
to fully testify as to his multiple-shooter theory and cast doubt on 
the State's single-shooter theory, the exclusion of the animations 
does not undermine our confidence in the verdict. 
2. The District Court's Exclusion of Dr. Ofshe's Testimonv Was 
_, 
Harmless 
1103 We next evaluate any prejudice arising from the errone-
ous exclusion of Dr. Ofshe' s testimony. We begin by noting that the 
district court did not err in admitting Mr. Perea's confession. Even 
had the district court allowed Dr. Ofshe to testify, the jury would 
have been entitled to consider Mr. Perea' s confession. Nor did it err 
in ruling that Dr. Ofshe could not testify as to the veracity of 
Mr. Perea's confession. Rather, its only error consisted in barring 
Dr. Ofshe' s proffered testimony about the factors that may contrib-
ute to false confessions. \Ve find this error to be harmless because of 
the overwhelming evidence of Mr. Perea's guilt. 
i1104 Multiple individuals who knew Mr. Perea testified that 
he shot into the crowd. Indeed, the defense's theory was not based 
on Mr. Perea' s exclusion from the crime but on a multiple-shooter 
theory. Thus, the exclusion of testimony that would have merely 
cast doubt on Mr. Perea's confession does not undermine our 
confidence in the verdict. Had this been a case like Clopten, in which 
the evidence of guilt was circumstantial and there were significant 
issues with eyewitness identification, the exclusion of Dr. Ofshe' s 
testimony would be more concerning. In that case, the admission of 
an unrebutted confession would have the potential to overwhelm 
anv other evidence of innocence. But here, where there was 
.I 
substantial, independent evidence of Mr. Perea' s guilt and his 
primary defense did not necessarily absolve him of the crime, the 
admission of Dr. Ofshe' s proposed testimony was unlikely to change 
the outcome of the trial. 
B. The District Court's Errors Do not Constitute Cumulative Error 
i-f 105 Having concluded that the district court's errors were 
harmless individually, we now evaluate their cumulative effect on 
our confidence in the verdict. Cumulative error is applicable in 
those instances where the district court's collective errors rise to a 
level that undermine our confidence in the fairness of the proceed-
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ings. But that analysis cannot be conducted in a vacuum, ignorant 
of the other evidence demonstrating guilt. 
,I106 The body of evidence established that Mr. Perea was at 
the crime scene that evening. It left no doubt that he was in the 
vehicle from which a number of witnesses testified the shots came. 
Those witnesses, two of whom were present in the vehicle, testified 
that it was Mr. Perea who fired shots into the crowd at Mr. Nava' s 
house. The two witnesses who were in the SUV, and at least one of 
whom witnessed the shooting from Mr. Nava's front yard, were 
personally familiar with Mr. Perea - he was not a nameless, faceless 
defendant to them. And, Mr. Perea' s knowledge of the type of 
weapon used in the shooting and the physical evidence at the crime 
scene provides further evidence that the jury could consider in 
evaluating his guilt. Finally, Mr. Perea' s confession was evidence 
that the jury was entitled to consider. 
,I107 vVhen viewed against the eyewitness testimony, the 
physical evidence, and Mr. Perea's confession, we cannot say that 
the district court's individual errors rise to the level of cumulative 
error. Where there is overwhelming evidence that Mr. Perea shot 
into the crowd, the exclusion of the expert testimony at issue does 
not undermine our confidence in the overall fairness of the proceed-
ings or the jury's verdict. 
VI. MR. PEREA'S SENTENCE OF LWOP IS CONSTITUTIONAL 
1108 Utah Code section 76-3-207.7 provides that " [a] person 
who has pled guilty to or been convicted of first degree felony 
aggravated murder ... shall be sentenced by the court ... [to] life in 
prison without parole or an indeterminate prison term of not less 
than 25 years and which may be for life.'' 
iJ109 Mr. Perea argues that section 76-3-207.7 violates the Utah 
Constitution and the U.S. Constitution in a number of ways. First, 
he argues that the statute is unconstitutionally vague because it 
authorizes arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. He next 
argues that the statute violates the Due Process and Equal Protection 
Clauses of the Utah Constitution and the federal Constitution and 
that it runs afoul of the uniform operation of laws provisions of the 
Utah Constitution. Finally, he argues that his sentence violates the 
unnecessary rigor provision of the Utah Constitution and the Cruel 
and Unusual Punishment Clause of the federal Constitution. We 
find these arguments unavailing and conclude that section 76-3-207.7 
is constitutional on its face and as applied to Mr. Perea. 
33 
STATE v. PEREA 
JUSTICE PARRISH, opinion of the Court 
A. Utah Code Section 76-3-207.7 Is not Unconstitutionally Vague 
1110 Because Utah Code section 76-3-207.7 does not list the 
factors a sentencing court must consider when deciding whether to 
impose a sentence of 25 years to life or LWOP, Mr. Perea argues that 
it is unconstitutional1y vague. Unconstitutionally vague laws violate 
the due process prohibition that no one "may be required at peril of 
life, liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal 
statutes." United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S.114, 123 (1979) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). Similarly, a statute may be unconstitu-
tionally vague if ,vritten in a way that "authorizes or even encour-
ages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.'' Hill v. Colorado, 530 
U.S. 703, 732 (2000). 
,111 In arguing that section 76-3-207.7 is unconstitutionally 
vague, Mr. Perea cites primarily to cases where courts have over-
turned statutes that did not adequately explain the criminal act. See, 
e.g., City lf Cl1icago v. i\1orale~, 527 U.S. 41, 64 (1999) (holding that a 
city's loitering statute was unconstitutionally vague because it gave 
officers unfettered discretion to criminalize otherwise lawful 
behavior). Although it is well settled that statutes must clearly 
articulate the behavior that they proscribe, there are far fewer cases 
in which vague sentencing guidelines have been overturned. Even 
so, the U.S. Supreme Court has made clear that "vague sentencing 
provisions may pose constitutional questions if they do not state 
with sufficient clarity the consequences of violating a given criminal 
statute." Batchelder, 442 U.S. at 123. 
1112 \Ve conclude that section 76-3-207.7 does not suffer from 
such an infirmitv. It states c1earlv that a defendant convicted of non-
., ., 
capital first-degree felony aggravated murder may be incarcerated 
for a term up to and induding the rest of his life. \'Vhile it also holds 
out the possibility of a more lenient sentence of 25 years to life, the 
fact that the sentencing court may choose to impose the more lenient 
sentence does not render the statute unconstitutional. Sentencing 
courts have long been afforded broad discretion in sentencing. And 
when section 76-3-207.7 is read in the context of Utah's sentencing 
scheme as a whole, we conclude that it provides sufficient guidance 
to withstand Mr. Perea's facial vagueness challenge. We further 
conclude that it was not unconstitutionally applied to Mr. Perea. 
~1113 District courts have historically been afforded broad 
discretion when it comes to sentencing. The U.S. Supreme Court has 
stated: 
[Although t]ribunals passing on the guilt of a defen-
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dant always have been hedged in by strict evidentiary 
procedural limitations ... both before and since the 
American colonies became a nation, courts in this 
country and in England practiced a policy under 
which a sentencing judge could exercise a wide 
discretion in the sources and types of evidence used to 
assist him in determining the kind and extent of 
punishment to be imposed within limits fixed by law. 
Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241,246 (1949).19 
,i114 So long as a statute clearly specifies the maximum 
allowable penalty, it is not unconstitutional for sentencing judges to 
exercise their discretion in offering leniency. See State v. Shelby, 728 
P.2d 987, 988 (Utah 1986) (stating that this court will overturn a 
sentence that is within the statutorily prescribed range only for an 
abuse of discretion). For example, sentencing judges may choose to 
suspend all or part of a sentence. See UTAH CODE§ 77-18-1(2)(a); 
Williams v. Harris, 149 P.2d 640, 642 (Utah 1944) (noting that "[t]he 
right to suspend imposition of sentence ... is a discretionary right"). 
Even under Utah's indeterminate sentencing scheme, where the 
actual time served by any particular defendant is determined by the 
Board of Pardons, sentencing judges are given discretion to sentence 
a defendant as if he had been convicted of the next lower degree of 
offense. UTAH CODE§ 76-3-402(1).20 And we can find no authority 
19See also State v. Shuler, 780 P.2d 1067, 1069 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989) 
(holding that a sentencing court may consider a defendant's 
"criminal character and history" despite the absence of prior 
convictions}; State v. Huey, 505 A.2d 1242, 1245-46 (Conn. 1986) 
(finding that a sentencing court may consider prior indictments, 
uncharged allegations, dismissed counts, and acquittals); Smith v. 
State, 517 A.2d. 1081, 1083 (:tvld. 1986) (holding that a sentencing 
judge may consider "the facts and circumstances of the crime itself 
and the background of the individual convicted of committing the 
crime"). 
20 Utah Code section 76-3-402(1) provides that if 
the court, having regard to the nature and circum-
stances of the offense of which the defendant was 
found guilty and to the history and character of the 
defendant ... concludes it would be unduly harsh to 
record the conviction as being for that degree of 
(continued ... ) 
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to support the notion that a sentencing judge's statutory authority 
to grant leniency renders a sentencing statute unconstitutional. 
1115 :tvlr. Perea argues that section 76-3-207.7 is impermissibly 
vague because it does not specify the particular items the sentencing 
court must consider in deciding which of the two possible sentences 
to impose. \Ve are unpersuaded. Section 76-3-207.7 must be read in 
the context of Utah's sentencing scheme as a whole. To give full 
effect to the Legislature's intent, we construe statutes in harmony 
"with other statutes under the same and related chapters." Lyon v. 
Burton, 2000 UT 19, i1 17, 5 P.3d 616. And, ·when read in context, the 
statutory scheme provides adequate guidance to sentencing courts. 
Utah Code section 76-1-104 provides that "[t]he provisions of [the 
criminal] code shall be construed ... [to p ]revent arbitrary or 
oppressive treatment . . . [ and to p ]rescribe penalties which are 
proportionate to the seriousness of offenses and which permit 
recognition o[f] differences in rehabilitation possibilities among 
individual offenders." Section 76-1-106 reinforces section 76-1-104 
by providing that" [ a ]II provisions of this code and offenses defined 
by the laws of this state shall be construed ... to effect the objects of 
the law and general purposes of [s]ection 76-1-104." When read in 
harmony, these provisions make clear that a sentencing court is to 
consider all the evidence before it-the totality of the circum-
stances-in imposing a sentence that is proportionate to the crime 
and the culpability of the defendant. 
811 116 The notion that a sentencing court should consider the 
totality of the circumstances in determining a proportionate sentence 
is also supported by our evidentiary rules. Rule 110l(c) of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence provides that our evidentiary rules do not apply 
during sentencing, opening the door to the court's evaluation of a 
variety of factors. See also State v. Sanwick, 713 P.2d 707, 708 (Utah 
1986) ( A sentencing court" must be permitted to consider any and all 
information that reasonably may bear on the proper sentence for the 
particular defendant, given the crime committed." ( quoting Wasman 
v. United States, 468 U.S. 559,563 {1984)). Because our rules do not 
constrain the introduction of any evidence tending to inform the 
20 ( ... continued) 
offense established by statute, the court may enter a 
judgment of conviction for the next lower degree of 
offense and impose sentence accordingly. 
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court's determination, it is not incumbent upon the statute to 
enumerate the factors the sentencing judge may or must consider. 
,I117 Indeed, it has only been in capital cases that we have 
required an explicit weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors. 
See, e.g., State v. Lafferty, 2001 UT 19,, 130, 20 P.3d 342 (reiterating 
the district court's obligation to weigh the mitigating and aggra.v at-
ing circumstances in a capital case); State v. Holland, 777 P.2d 1019, 
1027 (Utah 1989) (stating that the Ii first step'' in a capital sentencing 
evaluation is" to determine whether the aggravating circumstances 
outweigh the mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt''); 
State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 83 (Utah 1982) (holding that the capital 
sentencing standards" require that the sentencing body compare the 
totality of the mitigating against the totality of the aggravating 
factors"). Absent statutorily articulated aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances in noncapital cases, courts have historically based 
their sentencing decisions on the totality of the circumstances. See, 
e.g., State 1.1. Killpack, 2008 UT 49, ~ 59, 191 P.3d 17 (stating that 
'' courts must consider all legally relevant factors in making a 
sentencing decision"); State v. McClendon, 611 P.2d 728, 729 (Utah 
1980) (" A sentence in a criminal case should be appropriate for the 
def end ant in light of his background and the crime committed and 
also serve the interests of society which underlie the criminal justice 
system."). 
,r118 And that is exactly what the district court did here. 
Specifically, the district court found that ]\,fr. Perea's relative youth, 
his poor educational background, and his borderline IQ/learning 
disability constituted mitigating factors. But the district court found 
that there were a wealth of aggravating factors to offset these 
considerations, including the multiple young victims, the fact that 
1.1Ir. Perea fired ten shots into a large group of partygoers, and 
Mr. Perea's lengthy prior criminal record. 
'11119 Because district courts are 11 in the best position to ensure 
that justice is done and to determine whether any '[o]ne factor in 
mitigation or aggravation [should] weigh more than several factors 
on the opposite scale,"' they are" allowed a great deal of discretion 
in determining the relative weight of competing aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances." Slate v. lvforeno, 2005 UT App 200, 'lf 9, 
113 P.3d 992 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Russell, 791 P.2d 
188, 192 (Utah 1990)). And as here, where the district court consid-
ered the totality of the circumstances and explicitly weighed the 
mitigating and aggravating factors, we are not persuaded that it 
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abused its discretion or applied the statute in an unconstitutional 
fashion. 
B. A1r. Perea's Argument that Utah Code Section 76-3-207.7 Violates 
the Due Process Protections of the Utah and U.S. Constitutions Is 
Inadequately Briefed 
i1120 Mr. Perea next argues that section 76-3-207.7 violates the 
due process protections contained within the Utah and U.S. 
Constitutions. While he cites to relevant constitutional provisions, 
he provides absolutely no analysis as to how those provisions render 
his sentence unconstitutional. Because an issue is inadequately 
briefed "when it merely contains bald citation[s] to authority 
[without] development of that authority and reasoned analysis 
based on that authority," Smith v. Four Comers Mental Health Ctr, Inc., 
2003 UT 23, ~ 46, 70 P.3d 904 (alteration in original) (internal 
quotation marks omitted), we decline to address Mr. Perea' s 
assertion that section 76-3-207.7 violates his due process rights. 
C. Utah Code Section 76-3-207.7 Does not Violate the Uniform 
Operation of Laws Provision 
,J121 Mr. Perea argues that section 76-3-207.7 violates the 
uniform operation of laws provision of the Utah Constitution. 
Article 1, section 24 of the Utah Constitution requires that "[a]ll laws 
of a general nature sha11 have uniform operation." Under the 
uniform operation of laws provision, a statute must be "uniform on 
its face." State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d 991, 997 (Utah 1995). Further, it "is 
critical that the operation of the [statute] be uniform," such that 
similarly situated people are treated similarly under the statute. Id. 
( emphasis in original). 
iJ122 Our analysis under the uniform operation of laws 
provision requires that we first "determine what classifications, if 
any, are created by the statute." Id. \Ve must then analyze "whether 
different classes or subclasses are treated disparately. Finally, if any 
disparate treatment exists between classes or subclasses, we must 
determine whether the legislature had any reasonable objective that 
warrants the disparity." Id. Mr. Perea asserts that section 76-3-207.7 
divides the general class made up of those found guilty of aggra-
vated murder into two subclasses based on the sentence imposed by 
the district court. He then asserts that the disparate treatment 
between those sentenced to 25 years to life and those sentenced to 
LWOP is not justified because the statute fails to provide guidance 
to the district court. 
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,I123 We disagree. Not all those found guilty of aggravated 
murder are similarly situated. \tVhile all are found guilty of the same 
crime, each case and each defendant presents a different set of facts 
and a different combination of aggravating and mitigating factors. 
The discretion afforded to district courts furthers the legitimate 
legislative purpose of sentencing offenders based on the totality of 
the unique circumstances present in each case. District courts are 
authorized and empowered by the Legislature to review the totality 
of the circumstances before imposing a sentence. Therefore, because 
the discretion given to district courts furthers the legitimate 
legislative purpose of sentencing offenders based on the severity of 
their particular circumstances, we hold that section 76-3-207.7 does 
not violate our uniform operation of laws provision. 
D. Nir. Perea's Sentence Does not Violate tlze Unnecessary Rigor 
Provi~ion of the Utah Constitution 
1124 1\llr. Perea argues that his sentence of LWOP violates the 
Utah Constitution's unnecessary rigor provision because it fails to 
take into account his "age, mental disabilities and IQ." But Mr. 
Perea misapprehends the application of the unnecessary rigor 
provision. That provision protects prisoners from "the imposition 
of circumstances ... during their confinement that demand more of 
the prisoner than society is entitled to require." Dexter v. Bosko, 2008 
UT 29, ,I 17, 184 P.3d 592. It therefore applies only to the conditions 
of one's confinement and does not speak to the proportionality of the 
particular sentence imposed. The unnecessary rigor provision is 
therefore not implicated by the imposition of his sentence of L '\NOP. 
E . . Mr. Perea's Sentence Does not Constitute Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment Under the U.S. Constitution 
,I125 Finally, Mr. Perea argues that his sentence violates the 
Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which prohibits cruel 
and unusual punishments. He argues that his relatively young age, 
coupled with his low IQ, militates against a sentence of LWOP. In 
support of his argument, Mr. Perea cites to the Supreme Court's 
holdings in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005) (holding that 
juveniles, those persons under eighteen years of age, cannot be 
sentenced to death); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 75 (2010) (holding 
that the Eighth Amendment prohibits a sentence of LWOP for 
juvenile non-homicide offenders); and Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 
304, 318 (2002) (holding that persons with an IQ below 70 cannot be 
executed because such individuals are too mentally impaired to 
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"understand and process information, to communicate ... to engage 
in logical reasoning, [and] to control impulses"). 
1126 But the holdings of these cases are inapplicable to the 
present case. Roper does not controJ because Mr. Perea was neither 
sentenced to death21 nor a juvenile offender at the time of the 
shootings. It is uncontested that Mr. Perea was nineteen years old 
at the time of the shootings and he was sentenced only to LWOP. 
Similarly, the Court's holding in Graham is inapplicable because 
~fr. Perea was not found guilty of a non-homicide crime, but was 
found guilty of aggravated murder arising from the death of two 
individuals. Finally, it is uncontested that although Mr. Perea has 
been diagnosed with a low IQ, his score of 77 puts him above the 
line drawn by the Supreme Court in Atkins. 
'i\127 In spite of the differences between Mr. Perea and the 
defendants sentenced in Roper, Graham, and Atkins, the district court 
was authorized to evaluate the totality of the circumstances and 
could have chosen to impose a less severe sentence. It did not, 
however, based on its weighing of the aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances present in this case. And in the absence of a statutory 
mandate or compelling factual circumstances indicating the district 
court erred, we will not second-guess the district court, which is "in 
the best position to ensure that justice is done." l\1oreno, 2005 UT 
App 200, ,i 9. We therefore hold that Mr. Perea's sentence is not 
unconstitutional under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause 
of the federal Constitution. 
VIL MR PEREA'S CLAIM THAT ALL STATION-HOUSE 
CONFESSIONS SHOULD BE RECORDED DOES NOT 
CONSTITUTE GROUNDS FOR REVERSAL 
~128 Finally, we turn to l\,fr. Perea' s argument that we should 
require the police to record all confessions given at police stations. 
Mr. Perea argues that recording station-house confessions aids the 
fact finder in ascertaining the truth and that the absence of a 
recording makes it difficult to assess the voluntariness of a confes-
sion. The State concedes that" an electronic recording requirement 
21 See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 289-90 (1983) ("It is true that the 
penalty of death differs from all other forms of criminal punishment, 
not in degree but in kind. As a result, our decisions [in] capital cases 
are of limited assistance in deciding the constitutionality of the 
punishment in a noncapital case." (alteration in original) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
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would have benefits," but argues the determination of this issue is 
better left to a legislative body. While we have concerns about the 
Ogden Police Department's policy of not recording interrogations or 
confessions, this appeal is not the appropriate context for addressing 
those concerns. 
,-J129 Although Mr. Perea goes on at great length about the 
necessity of recording a suspecf s confession, he concedes that such 
recordings are not required by the Utah Constitution or our case 
law.22 Nor does lvfr. Perea explain how a ruling in his favor on this 
issue would change the outcome of his appeal. Rather, lv1r. Perea 
argues that this court" should require'' the recording of station-house 
confessions - a prospective ruling that would not impact the 
investigators' decision not to record the confession in this case. 
~130 Because there was no constitutional, statutory, or 
common law obligation for the investigators to record Mr. Perea' s 
confession, and because any ruling that law enforcement should 
record interrogations in the future would have no effect on the case 
before us, we decline r-...fr. Perea' s invitation to judicially pronounce 
a requirement that investigators record station-house confessions. 
Nevertheless, the benefits of recording station-house confessions are 
worth considering,23 especially when viewed in light of current 
22 See State v. Villarreal, 889 P.2d 419,427 (Utah 1995) (concluding 
that the recording of confessions is not required by the Utah 
Constitution). 
23 Such benefits include "avoiding unwarranted claims of 
coercion," preventing the use of" actual coercive tactics by police," 
and demonstrating "the voluntariness of the confession, the context 
in which a particular statement was made, and ... the actual content 
of the statement." State v. James, 858 P.2d 1012, 1018 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). The recording of confes-
sions provides clear evidence of coercion or a lack of coercion and 
assists the fact finder in determining a confession's voluntariness. 
Furthermore, such recordings protect police officers and depart-
ments from false claims of coercion and misconduct. In the past, 
there were serious technical and cost barriers to recording confes-
sions. But such concerns have been largely ameliorated by technol-
ogy. The necessary equipment is not cost prohibitive and is 
standard equipment on almost every cell phone. When police 
officers refuse to record interrogations and confessions despite the 
(continued ... ) 
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technological advances and the Attorney General's recommenda-
tions in favor of recording.24 These potential benefits, along with 
possible arguments against recording station-house confessions, are 
most appropriately addressed in the first instance by our Advisory 
Committee on the Rules of Evidence, ,vithin which the relative 
merits of mandating a recording requirement can be fully debated. 
CONCLUSION 
~131 The district court did not err when it denied Mr. Perea' s 
motion to suppress his confession because, even if his ambiguous 
statement made two davs before he was taken into custodv was 
J J 
sufficient to constitute an invocation of his right to counsel under the 
Sixth Amendment, Mr. Perea thereafter voluntarily waived his right 
to counsel. Similarly, the district court did not err when it barred the 
testimony of potentially exculpatory witnesses whom the defense 
would not identify. 
1132 Although the district court did err when it limited and 
excluded the testimony of the defense's expert witnesses, we 
conclude these errors were harmless. Similarly, the combined result 
of these errors does not undermine our confidence in the verdict. 
VVe also find that section 76-3-207.7 is not unconstitutional and thus 
affirm I\.1r. Perea' s sentence. Finally, the arguments for and against 
a requirement to record station~house confessions are more appro-
priately addressed through the administrative process. 
23(. .. continued) 
presence of recording equipment, the State runs the risk that the fact 
finder will draw the natural inference that the officers have at-
tempted to hide some aspect of the interrogation, even when there 
are no ill intentions. 
24 In 2008, the Utah Attorney General's Office, in cooperation with 
statewide law enforcement organizations, drafted a statement for 
law enforcement that recommends electronic recording of custodial 
interviews and gives guidelines for doing so. Contrary to those 
recommendations, Ogden Police Department policy dictates that 
officers are not to electronically record interrogations or confessions. 
Despite the fact that the room in which Mr. Perea was questioned 
was equipped to record (and an officer actually watched a live feed), 
no effort was made to record his interrogation and subsequent 
confession. 
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JUSTICE DUR.YAM, concurring: 
~133 I concur fully in the reasoning and the result of the 
majority opinion. I only write separately to express my views 
regarding the Ogden Police Department's policy not to record 
station-house interrogations or confessions-despite having the 
means to do so. At the present time, I am persuaded that recording 
confessions can only further the interests of justice by enhancing a 
court's ability both to safeguard important Sixth Amendment 
protections and to detect false claims of improper police coercion. 
See supra~ 132 n.23. Due to these benefits, I believe that we should 
adopt an evidentiary rule requiring station-house interrogations to 
be recorded. I do not object to the referral of the question to our 
rules advisory committee for study and recommendations, but note 
that on the present state of the evidence and policy considerations 
regarding this question, the arguments for a rule appear strong. 
JUSTICE LEE, concurring: 
~134 I agree with and concur in the court's op1mon and 
disposition of this case, including its determination not to opine on 
the "advisability" of issuing a rule regarding station-house interro-
gations. Supra ii 132. As the majority opinion explains, we are in no 
position to weigh in on this maller, as there is no law currently 
requiring recording of such interrogations and "a prospective 
ruling ... would not impact the investigators' decision not to record 
the confession in this case." Supra ii 131. 
1135 In my view that should be the end of the matter. If we are 
to leave it to our Advisory Committee on the Rules of Evidence to 
address this question "in the first instance," suprn ,i 132, we should 
not get ahead of the committee by weighing in through our opinions 
in this case. Thus, I would not express the view "that recording 
confessions can only further the interests of justice," or endorse the 
position "that we should adopt an evidentiary rule requiring station-
house interrogations to be recorded." Supra ,1 135 (Durham, J., 
concurring). 
iJ136 First, we have no authority to adopt a rule, of evidence or 
otherwise, "requiring station-house interrogations to be recorded." 
Supra ,r 135. Our supervisory rulemaking authority extends only to 
matters of evidence and procedure. See UTAH CONST. art. VIII,§ 4 
("The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of procedure and evidence 
to be used in the courts of the state and shall by rule manage the 
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appellate process."). It does not encompass the power to direct the 
operations of law enforcement. 
1137 Second, although we conceivably could adopt a rule 
deeming unrecorded stationhouse confessions inadmissible under 
the law of evidence, I do not think we have sufficient perspective on 
the matter to opine on the wisdom of such a rule at this juncture. 
Certainly there would be upsides to a rule foreclosing the admissibil-
ity of unrecorded confessions, as acknowledged above. See supra 
,r 132. But I have no idea whether the benefits of such a rule are 
"strong," supra CU 135, much less whether they might outweigh any 
of the various costs or downsides of that approach (none of which 
have been presented to us on this appeal, but surely will be consid-
ered by our advisory committee in due course). 
i!138 Finally, the devil is undoubtedly in the details here. The 
decision whether to adopt a rule of evidence should of course be 
informed by the nature and content of any proposed rule. Such a 
rule, moreover, would almost certainly have to be subject to 
exceptions set forth in any proposed rule. And unless and until we 
have the proposed text in front of us, I see no basis for an advisory 
thumb on the scale in its favor. I would accordingly await the 
results of our advisory committee process instead of weighing in in 
advance. 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT co DISTRICT counr 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RIQOPEREA, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent. 
RULING AND ORDER ON 
PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR 
RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT 
Trial Court Case No. 140907173 
Appellate Court Case No. 20150144 
Judge Ernie W. Jones 
THE MATTER IS BEFORE THE COURT on Petitioner's Motion for Relief from 
Judgment filed on July 23, 2015. The State filed an opposition on September 21, 2015. Petitioner 
did not file a reply, and the time for filing a reply is now past. See Utah R. Civ. Pro. Rule 7(c)(l). 
Although neither party has filed a request to submit for decision, the Court of Appeals has 
ordered this court to enter a ruling on Petitioner's motion within 60 days after remand. 
Therefore, the court now enters its ruling DENYING Petitioner's motion as follows. 
Petitioner filed his petition for post-conviction relief on November 12, 2014. The court 
reviewed the petition pursuant to rule 65C(h)(l) and entered an order dismissing the petition on 
January 12, 2015, because all of Petitioner's claims had already been fully adjudicated by the 
Utah Supreme Court in State v. Perea, 2013 UT 68. 
Petitioner now asks this court to set aside its order of summary dismissal pursuant to rule 
60(b)(6). Petitioner alleges that on July 2, 2015-seven months after this court dismissed the 
petition-Sarah Valencia infonned PetitionerJs counsel that she had been pressured to testify 
falsely during Petitioner's criminal trial. Ms. Valencia signed an affidavit recanting her trial 
testimony, and Petitioner attached a copy of her affidavit to his motion. According to Petitioner, 
Ruling on Motion for Relief from Judgment 
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because the Supreme Court heavily weighed Sarah Valencia's testimony in determining that any 
errors at Petitioner's criminal trial were harmless, the court should grant Petitioner relief from 
judgment based upon her affidavit. 
In response, the State contends Petitioner's motion cannot be filed under rule 60(b)(6) 
because he is claiming newly-discovered evidence under rule 60(b )(2). As such, Petitioner had 
90 days after the court dismissed the petition to file his motion. Because Petitioner filed his 
motion over seven months after the court entered its order, according to the State, the motion is 
untimely. 
To the extent Petitioner's motion is more properly labeled as a motion under rule 
60(b)(2), the court finds that it is untimely and dismisses it on that basis. However, to the extent 
Petitioner's motion is more properly submitted under rule 60(b)(6), the court concludes the 
motion is timely. 1 A motion under rule 60(b)(6) must be filed within a "reasonable time." 
Petitioner filed the motion only three weeks after learning of Ms. Valencia's allegations, which is 
a reasonable time under the rule. 
However, even if the motion is timely under rule 60(b)(6), the court concludes Petitioner 
has not raised a meritorious defense to justify setting aside the dismissal of the petition. See 
Menzies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81, ,r 108. Ms. Valencia's affidavit has no relation or relevance to 
the claims asserted in the petition, and Petitioner offers no basis upon which the court should set 
aside the dismissal of those claims. Rather, Petitioner presents an entirely new issue to the court 
without regard to the claims he has previously adjudicated and that have previously been 
dismissed. A motion for relief from judgment is, therefore, improper in this circumstance. 
1 Because Ms. Valencia's affidavit is not newly-discovered evidence that puts any of the claims in the petition in a 
new light, the claim, arguably, does not fall into the rule 60(b)(2) subsection. 
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Indeed, as suggested by the State, Petitioner's claim would more appropriately be brought in a 
new petition for post-conviction relief. 
Accordingly, Petitioner's motion is denied. This ruling and order is the order of the 
court. No further order under rule 7(f)(2) is required. 
Dated this_{__ ~ay of October, 2015. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the J12._ day of GC-\:tio:t:X , 2015, I sent a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing ruling to the following: 
Erin Riley 
Assistant Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
Randall W. Richards 
Richards & Brown PC 
Attorney for Petitioner 
938 University Park Blvd Suite140 
Clearfield, Utah 84015 
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RANDALL W. RICHARDSW #4503 of 
RICHARDS & BROWN P.C. 
938 University Park Blvd., Suite 140 
Clearfield, UT 84015 
Telephone: (801) 773-2080 
Facsimile: (801) 773-5078 
laV1yers@richardsbrownlaw.com 
IN THE SECOND DISTRICT JUDICIAL COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RIQO MARIANO PEREA ) NOTICE OF APPEAL 
PETITIONER 
) 
·vs. 
) Case No.140907173 
STATE OF UTAH Judge: JONES 
) 
RESPONDENT 
) 
COMES NOW the above named Petitioner, Rico Perea, by and through his 
attorney, Randall W. Richards and hereby gives notice of intent to appeal the Order of 
Summary Dismissal on the Petitioner's Petition for Relief under the Post Conviction 
Remedies Act filed on November 11, 2014, that was entered hereon in the above-
entitled case on or about the 12th day of January 2015 to the Supreme Court of Utah. 
DATED this n th day of February 2015. 
_/s/: Randall W. Richards_ 
RANDALL W. RICHARDS 
Attorney for Petitioner 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I served a true and correct copy of the foregoing Notice of 
Appeal .... this 11th day of February, 2015 to 
Weber County Attorney 
2380 Washington Blvd., Suite 140 
Ogden, UT 84401 
/s/Kari L. Kulak 
Paralegal 
ADDENDUMD 
Affidavit of Sarah Valencia 
AFFIDAVIT OF SARAH VALENCIA 
SARAH VALENCIA does hereby swear or affirm, upon information and belief 
that: 
1. - I was a witness in the ·case of State v. Riqo Perea, and testified at his murder trial. 
2. At the time of the trial and before that, I was under the impression that the police 
were pressuring me to testify in a certain way at that trial. 
3. I have had some time to think about the testimony that I gave and believe that I 
need to correct some of the statements that I made at trial which I believe are not 
accurate. 
4. I was at the home during the shooting, and I did in fact see Riqo prior to the 
· · shooting, as he was a good" friend of mine. To the best of my recollection he ·was 
also at least friendly with Sabrina Prieto, and to the best of my knowledge had 
nothing against her or me. 
5. After the shooti1:1g occUITed I ~ in shock having lost with my good friend 
Sabrina and the police immediately approached me once I arrived at the hospital 
and said that I had to talk to them. 
6. During the ~nversation with the police, I felt threatened as far as the officers 
mentioned I may be losing custody of my son, and getting into trouble unless I 
was a witness for them. They informed me that I could either be a witness or I 
would be a suspect. 
7. I was also very ill that night, and was not feeling good that evening, and therefore 
did not eat or drink much at the wedding party, and I was actually throwing up at 
the hospital due to my illness and nerves. 
8. I told the detectives that I could not see the occupants of the car that I couldn't 
see their faces, but the officer insisted that it was Riqo and Bubba (Marquis 
Lucero). I informed the police that he couldn't have been Bubba because I didn't 
see him there that night. 
9. Approximately a month or so after the shooting, I was again questioned by the 
police and I overheard the officers talked about the fact that Sabrina was running 
toward the garage and was shot in the chest and therefore there may have been a 
v; _______________ _ 
i I..P . 
shooter in the garage area. I asked the officers about this fact, and they told me 
that although the CSI and found some bullets there, that they didn't believe that 
happened. I was confused and scared, and therefore I went along with what the 
officers told me to say. 
10. I also recall that prior to the trial occurring I was asked to meet at the 
prosecutor's office on 24th and Washington and they showed me maps and again 
told me what to say in trial. Again I was scared and worried about my child and 
therefore went along with what they told me to testify about. 
11. I could not testify that I ever saw Riqo with the gun that evening, and I clearly did 
not see the face of the shooter in the vehicle, therefore any testimony that I gave 
contradicting those facts would not be accurate. 
DATED this Q, ltd day of July 2015. 
SARAH VALEN CIA 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this f).~ day of July 2015. 
• 
KARI LYNN KULAK 
NOTAA'f PUBUC. STATE ot llT'AH 
cOMMISSION NO. 658161 
COMM. EXP. 03/2B/20H 
~ ~".h,Ou:_ 
Notary Public 
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RANDALL WRICHARDS (#4503) 
Attorney for Appellant 
RICHARDS & BROWN PC 
738 University Park Blvd. #140 
Clearfield, Utah 84015 
Telephone: (801) 773-2080 
Facsimile: 1- 801-773-5078 
Email: Randy@richardsbrownlaw.com 
IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
RIQO MARIANO PEREA, PETITION FOR 
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 
Petitioner, 
v. 
Case No. I~ C'10·1 17 '3 
JUDGE: 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent. 
Pursuant to the Utah Post-conviction Remedies Act and Utah R. Civ. P. 
65C, RIQO PEREA hereby petitions the Court for post-conviction relief. He is 
currently incarcerated in the Utah State Prison in Draper, Utah. 
I. NAME OF THE RESPONDENT: RIQO PEREA 
X Conviction of a felony X State of Utah 
II. IDENTIFICATION OF CURRENT AND RELATED CASES 
1. (a) Name of Court that entered judgment below: Second District 
Court, Weber County, State of Utah, the Honorable Ernest Jones 
presiding. 
(b) Location: Ogden, Utah. 
1 
(c) Case Number: 071901847 
2 .. Date of judgment: ~ay 27, 2010 .. 
3. Sentence: Two counts Aggravated Murder, Life without parole. Two 
Counts Attempted Murder . 
4. Nature of Offenses involved: Two Counts Aggravated Murder 
5. What was your plea? Not guilty. 
6. Not guilty pled as to all counts. 
7. Trial was before a jury. 
8. Perea did not testify. 
9. Perea appealed from the convictions. 
10. Appellate information 
(a) Name of Appellate Court: Supreme Court of Utah 
(b) Case number: 20100891-SC 
( e} Result: Convictions Affirmed. . . -. . 
(d) Date of opinion: November 15, 2013. 
---(lc'-e'T) ..... Ts .... SJ ..... Jes raised: 
Whether the trial court erroneously denied the defendant's ability to 
present his 
defense by limiting an expert's testimony on crime scene reconstruction. 
Whether the trial court erroneously excluded the testimony of defense 
expert 
Richard G. Ofshe, an expert in false confessions. 
Whether this Court should require recording of police interrogations that 
occur at 
police stations. 
Whether an imposition of life without parole, for a nineteen-year-old with 
an IQ of 77 violates the United States and Utah Constitutional prohibition on 
cruel and unusual 
2 
punishment, and whether Utah's life without parole statute violates guarantees of 
equal 
protection and due process. 
Whether the combination of the above errors and other unraised errors 
constitutes 
cumulative error. 
III. Grounds for relief: 
(a) Ground 1: Whether the trial court erroneously denied the defendant's · 
ability to present his defense by limiting an expert's testimony on crime scene 
reconstruction. 
Supporting facts for ground 1: The trial court held, pretrial, that the 
defense expert would be allowed to present his theory, and that flaws in his 
testimony went to its weight. Mid-trial, in response to a last-minute State motion, 
the trial court abruptly, and erroneously, changed its decision and prohibited the 
defense's forensic scientist from presenting any demonstrative exhibits. The trial 
court's ruling unconstitutionally denied the defendant the most persuasive 
evidence of his innocence. Additionally, the court unconstitutionally prohibited 
the defense expert from contradicting the State's witnesses. This significantly 
hampered defendant's ability to present a case which it had prepared for months 
prior to trial. The trial court's ruling literally five minutes before the beginning of 
the defense presentation of evidence required a complete change in trial strategy 
and presentation. Finally, the trial court allowed the State to rebut the defense 
expert with its own charts and to comment on the defense expert's testimony, 
effectively expressing a preference for the State's case and theory. 
3 
(b) Ground 2: Whether the trial court erroneously excluded the testimony 
of defense expert Richard G. Ofshe, an expert in false confessions. 
Supporting facts for ground 2: The trial court prohibited the defense from 
presenting expert testimony surrounding false confessions, particularly the 
strong possibility that Riqo falsely confessed to this offense. However, the 
scientific literature repeatedly supports the proposition that people falsely 
confess to crimes, that juries are not aware of the phenomenon, and that juries 
tend to overvalue confessions. Expert testimony has repeatedly been held to be 
critical to help establish a claim of a false confession and the trial court 
erroneously deprived the defense of the opportunity to present this evidence. 
(c) Ground 3: Newly discovered•evidence. Whether the trial court erred in 
denying Mr. Perea's motion to suppress his confession for a Miranda violation. 
Supporting facts for ground 3= The defendant clearly and unequivocally 
·· ·invoked his right-to-deal with the poliee-in interrogation.onl-y-with the assistance. 
of counsel, although he was not in custody at the time of the invocation. A 
defendant can anticipatorily invoke his right to counsel and the police were duty 
bound to honor the defendant's request. Hence, the trial court erred in denying 
. . .. _the..defendanfs motion to suppr~~ theJ~9_nf~io_J:.1~~- ... _____ _ 
( d) Ground 4: Whether the trial court erroneously failed to allow critical 
defense witnesses to testify anonymously in order to protect them from gang 
retaliation. 
Supporting facts for ground 4: Witnesses approached defense counsel 
willing to testify that a person other than Riqo Perea did the shooting at issue in 
this case, but that they feared for their safety and wished to testify anonymously. 
4 
The trial court failed to take necessary steps to protect these witnesses, and in 
fact ordered the defense to disclose their names so that law enforcement could 
conduct a full investigation. The trial court erroneously took steps that ensured 
these witnesses would not cooperate with the court or with defense counsel, 
ultimately resulting in the loss of critical defense testimony. 
(e) Ground 5: Whether an imposition of life without parole, for a nineteen-
year-old with an IQ of 77 violates the United States and Utah Constitutional 
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, and whether Utah's life without 
parole statute violates guarantees of equal protection and due process. 
Supporting facts for ground 5: Riqo Perea presented evidence at the 
motion hearing that at the time of the offense he was 19 years old and had a full 
scale IQ of 77. The Utah and United States Constitutions prohibit sentencing a 
19-yearwith an IQ of77 and various mental illnesses to the punishment of life 
without parole, as it is cruel and unusual and in violation of unnecessary rigor. 
Additionally, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207.7 is unconstitutionally vague since it 
gives no discretion to the court and denies a defendant proper due process by 
removing the sentencing decision from the jury. 
REQUIRED ATTACHMENTS 
1. The judgment and commitment being challenged - Attachment 1. 
(b) Any decision issued by an appellate court from the direct appeal -
Attachment 2. 
5 
________ _ ______________ (c1 Aily_i:irevi«?usly-filed petition fo~ :p~st-c~n~<:_~?_Il -~~!i~!!_~~<l.-~~--- ____________________ _ 
decision issued as a result. None 
(d) Affidavits, records, or other documentary evidence that support your 
claim. Attachments 3. 
( e) Memorandum of Points and Authorities. Attachment 4. 
V. PETITIONER'S VERIFICATION UNDER OATH 
PETITIONER'S VERIFICATION UNDER OATH 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF Davis }ss. 
I, the undersigned petitioner, declare under penalty of perjury that the information 
have provided in this petition is true and correct. 
/s/: RIOO MARIANO PEREA 
Signed by Randall W. Richards with Permission from Riqo Perea 
SIGNATURE OF PETITIONER 
Subscribed and sworn to before me on: 11/12/2014 
_Kari Lynn Kulak~-------------
NoTARY PUBLIC 
Residi~g in: Davis County, UT_ 
My Commission Expires: _03/29 /2017 _______ _ 
VI. CERTIFICATION OF ATTORNEY 
I certify I am the attorney for petitioner, and that this petition complies with Rule 
11, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
/s/: Randall W. Richards 
SIGNATURE OF ATTORNEY 
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ADDENDUM( 
Notice of Appeal 
RANDALL W. RICHARDSW #4503 of 
RICHARDS & BROWN P.C. 
938 University Park Blvd., Suite 140 
Clearfield, UT 84015 
Telephone: (801) 773-2080 
Facsimile: (801) 773-5078 
lawvers@richardsbrownlaw.com 
IN THE SECOND DISTRICT JUDICIAL COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RIQO MARIANO PEREA ) NOTICE OF APPEAL 
PETITIONER 
) 
- ·vs. 
) Case No.140907173 
STATE OF UTAH Judge: JONES 
) 
RESPONDENT 
) 
COMES NOW the above named Petitioner, Rico Perea, by and through his 
attorney, Randall W. Richards and hereby gives notice of intent to appeal the Order of 
Summary Dismissal on the Petitioner's Petition for Relief under the Post Conviction 
Remedies Act filed on November 11, 2014, that was entered hereon in the above-
entitled case on or about the 12th day of January 2015 to the Supreme Court of Utah. 
DATED this 11th day of February 2015. 
_/s/: Randall W. Richards_ 
RANDALL W. RICHARDS 
Attorney for Petitioner 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I served a true and correct copy of the foregoing Notice of 
Appeal .... this 11th day of February, 2015 to 
Weber County Attorney 
2380 Washington Blvd., Suite 140 
Ogden, UT 84401 
/s/Kari L. Kulak 
Paralegal 
ADDENDUMD 
Affidavit of Sarah Valencia 
AFFIDAVIT OF SARAH VALENCIA 
SARAH VALENCIA does hereby swear or affirm, upon infonnation and belief 
that: 
· 1. · I was a witness in the ·case of State v. Riqo Perea, and testified at his murder trial. 
2. At the time of the trial and before that, I was under the impression that the police 
were pressuring me to testify in a certain way at that trial. 
3. I have had some time to think about the testimony that I gave and believe that I 
need to correct some of the statements that I made at trial which I believe are not 
accurate. 
4. I was at the home during the shooting, and I did in fact see Riqo prior to the 
· · shooting, as he was a good· friend of mine. To the best of my recollection he was 
also at least friendly with Sabrina Prieto, and to the best of my knowledge had 
nothing against her or me. 
5. Afte~ the shooting occ~d I~ in shock having lost wi~h my good friend_ 
Sabrina and the police immediately approached me once I arrived at the hospital 
and said that I had to talk to them. 
6. During the ~nversation with the police, I felt threatened as far as the officers 
mentioned I may be losing custody of my son, and getting into trouble unless I 
was a witness for them. They informed me that I could either be a witness or I 
would be a suspect. 
7. I was also very ill that night, and was not feeling good that evening, and therefore 
did not eat or drink much at the wedding party, and I was actually throwing up at 
the hospital due to my illness and nerves. 
8. I told the detectives that I could not see the occupants of the car that I couldn't 
see their faces, but the officer insisted that it was Riqo and Bubba (Marquis 
Lucero). I informed the police that he couldn't have been Bubba because I didn't 
see him there that night. 
9. Approximately a month or so after the shooting, I was again questioned by the 
police and I overheard the officers talked about the fact that Sabrina was running 
toward the garage and was shot in the chest and therefore there may have been a 
·.j _______________ _ 
...,; : 
shooter in the garage area. I asked the officers about this fact, and they told me 
that although the CSI and found some bullets there, that they didn't believe that 
happened. I was confused and scared, and therefore I went along with what the 
officers told me to say. 
10. I also recall that prior to the trial occurring I was asked to meet at the 
prosecutor's office on 24th and Washington and they showed me maps and again 
told me what to say in trial. Again I was scared and worried about my child and 
therefore went along with what they told me to testify about. 
~ -
11. I could not testify that I ever saw Riqo with the gun that evening, and I clearly did 
not see the face of the shooter in the vehicle, therefore any testimony that I gave 
_ contradicting those facts would not be accurate. 
~nd DATED this_ .... ~...__·_\.: __ day of July 2015. 
SARAH VALEN CIA 
this ~~ SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me _.,____ day of July 2015. 
• 
KARI LYNN KULAK 
uoTAJff PUBLIC. STATE ot UTAH 
cOMMISSION NO. 658161 
COMM. EXP. 03/2Q/20'1 
~ ~ ,:b.Ou:__ 
Notary Public 
v -------------------
. -· ··-····- . ··• ---·-·---·---····-· 
ADDENDUME 
Witness Statements 
iJJ 
Angelo Gallegos and Elias Garcia 
@ 
ANGELO GALLEGOS 
@ 
@ 
1 the course of the 10 or so minutes that you were there? 
2 A. Probahl y like when we were leaving, getting ready to 
3 leave. 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Do you know who was involved in that argurcent? 
Riqo. 
Who else? Anybody else? 
I don't know. 
After that argument happened, what did you do? 
9 A. Was entering the car, getting ready to enter the car 
10 to leave. 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
18 A. 
19 Q. 
20 A. 
21 after. 
22 Q. 
23 fran? 
24 
25 
A. 
Q. 
Okay. And did you then enter the car? 
Yeah. 
Do you know what the defendant was doing? 
He was already in the car. 
Okay. Where was he? 
In the front passenger. 
Okay. As the car was leaving what happened? 
I heard gunshots. 
Okay. Did you - do you know how many? 
I heard one or two, and then there were several 
Okay. Do you know where those gunshots were coming 
Front passenger. 
And how do you know that? 
ANGELO GALLEGOS - Direct by MR. SHAW 10 
l A. Because I seen the lights from a gun getting shot off 
2 right in front, the passenger. 
3 Q. Okay. Could you tell where - could you see the 
4 defendant' s head, chest and body? 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
His upper body. 
Okay. Could you see his head? 
No. 
Could you see his neck? 
No. 
--- -·----·-- -··---
~~-----~---Okay. Did you see a gun in the defendant's hand as 
11 shots were being fired? 
12 
13 
14 
15 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
No. 
Okay. What happened after the shots were · fired? 
We were driving toward Washington Boulevard. 
Okay. When you got to Washington Boulevard, do you 
16 know which direction the vehicle turned? 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 go? 
22 
23 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
24 happened? 
25 A. 
Left. 
Okay. 
South. 
That would be south? 
Okay. After it turned south where did the vehicle 
Seventh Street. 
All right. Now, when you got to Seventh Street, what 
There was a threat ma.de toward me and several others. 
ANGELO GALLEGOS - Direct by MR. SHAW 11 
. ) 
1 Q. And who made that threat? 
2 A. Riqo. 
3 Q. What did he say? 
4 A. If we said anything, 'Lhere would be a bullet with our 
5 name on it. 
6 Q. During the course of the travel from the crime scene 
7 to the house near Seventh and Washington, did the Defendant say 
8 anything else? 
9 
10 name. 
11 
12 
A. The same thing, there would be a bullet with our 
MR. SHAW: That Is all. 
THE COURT: Mr. Richards? 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
BY MR. RICHARDS: 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q . 
A. 
Q. 
Now, you are a member of a gang. Is that correct? 
No. 
Were you at that time? 
No, I was not. 
You were not a member of the Ogden Trece gang? 
I am not. My brother is, but I am not. 
Okay. Let me show you an exhibit marked State's 
22 Exhibit - Defense Exhibit No. 1 and ask you if you know this 
23 individual? 
24 
25 
A. . .. Yes. 
Q. And who's that? 
ANGELO GALLEGOS - Cross by MR. RICHARDS 12 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
They call him Dad. I don't know him. Elias? 
Was he there that night? 
Yeah. 
And whose Dad is he of'? 
I don't know. 
Do you know a Christopher Garcia? 
Christopher Garcia? 
Elias Christopher? 
Elias. I know Elias. I know him by Elias. 
He's your age, isn't he? 
Again, I suppose. 
Well, you grew up together, didn't you? 
Well, I don't really know him. I never really hung 
14 out with him, but I know I've seen him around. 
15 Q. Was he in the car that night with you? 
16 A. Yes, he was. 
17-- Q. But you didn't hang~ 
18 A. other than that night, no. 
19 Q. That's the only time you've ever hung out with 
20 Christopher? 
21 A. Yep. 
22 Q. And you know Riqo? 
23 A. Yes, I do. 
24 Q. And did you hang out with Riqo? 
25 A. Yes, I hung out with ltiqo. 
ANGELO GALLEGOS - Cross by MR. RICHARDS 
L 
13 
;) 
. .; 
.J 
1 
2 
3 
4 
s 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
And did Christopher hang out with Riqo a lot? 
Not when I was around. 
So where did you grow up at? 
On thirty-second and Lincoln. 
And where did Riqo grow up at? 
6 A. At Third below Grant. Right above Grant between 
7 Grant and Washington Boulevard. 
8 
9 
10 
Q. And do you know where Christopher lived and grew up? 
A. I do not. 
Q. Now, this situation that happened . on March 5th, that 
11 night, why were you hanging out with Riqo and Christopher that 
12 night? 
13 A . We were going to go party, going to hang out, drink 
14 beer. 
1S Q. Okay. And that's the first time you've ever hung out 
16 with Christopher? 
17 A. Yep. I've seen him in school often, but I never -
18 me and him never associated. 
19 Q. And it's not true that you are both members of a 
20 gang, you and Christopher? 
A. I am not. 
MR. SHAW: Asked and answered, your Honor. 
THE COURT: SUstained. 
THE WITNESS: I am not. 
21 
22 
23 
24 
2S THE COURT: You answered that before. You don't need 
ANGELO GALLEGOS - Cross by HR. RICHARDS 14 
1 to answer again. 
2 Q. (BY MR. RICHARDS) So you were going to go party and 
3 where were you going to go party at, go drinking at? 
4 A. I don't know. I didn't know where we were going. I 
5 just know we were going to go party. 
6 Q. So you get into a car and did you know the driver of 
7 the car? 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
16 
A. No, I do not. 
Q. It was a lady, wasn't it? 
A. Fran what - yeah, fran what I remember, yeah. 
Q. Do you remember her name? 
A. 
Q. 
I do not. 
Okay. And who else was in the car with you? 
A. There was me, that girl -
A. The driver. You said his name was Elias? Elias, two 
17 kids and another girl. 
18 
19 
20 -
21 
22 
Q. And the kids were how old? 
A. I don't remenber. 
Q. Okay:·· How about-the·-other girl,- what··was- her name!?-
A. I don't know. 
Q. Okay. And so you' re in this car with people you 
23 don't ever know other than Riqo? 
24 
25 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. And you're going to go party and get drunk? 
ANGELO GALLEGOS - Cross by MR. RICHARDS 15 
v 
1 A. Yep. 
2 Q. And you don't know where you are going? 
3 A. Don't know. OUr intention was just go party. 
4 Q. Okay. And then you stop at a house, and you don't 
5 know Christina? 
Unh-unh. 
And do you know the Navas? 
6 
7 
8 
A. 
Q. 
A. I knew Sabrina. That's the only person I knew _there. 
9 There - that -
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q . 
Did you see her there at the party? 
Yeah. 
And you heard an argument going on. Is that right? 
Yes, I did. 
And Riqo was arguing? 
Yes. 
And who else was he arguing with? 
I don't know. 
Were there many people there? 
There was - at the party? 
Arguing. 
Explain that again. 
Arguing. 
. .23 MR. SHAW:- Well, objection your Honor. He obviously 
24 doesn't understand the question. 
25 THE COURT: May.be just rephrase the question then. 
ANGELO GALLEGOS - Cross by MR. RICHARDS 16 
l Q. 
2 Ri ? qo. 
3 A. 
4 Q. 
5 A. 
6 Q. 
7 A. 
8 Q. 
9 A. 
10 Q. 
11 A. 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 that. 
18 Q. 
19 A. 
(BY MR. RICHARDS) How many people were arguing with 
Just one that I can :ecall of. 
And was it a male or female? 
Before the incident happened, it was a female. 
So Riqo was arguing with the female? 
Uh-huh. 
And was Elias? 
No. 
He wasn't arguing? 
No. 
MR. SHAW: Well, which Elias? 
MR. RICHARDS: Well, the one he knows, I guess. 
THE WITNESS: Which - I don't - I don't know. 
MR. SHAW: Let's find out which one. 
THE COURT: Go ahead. Maybe you can just clarify 
(BY MR. RICHARDS) Go ahead. 
I don't know which Elias you are talking about. 
20 Q. Okay. We have the son - well, I thought you didn't 
21 know this one? 
22 
23 
24 
25 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
I have seen him. 
Do you know his name? 
No. 
Well, then how cane you are confused about which 
ANGELO GALLEGOS - Cross by MR. RICHARDS 17 
) 
J 
J 
.J 
.) 
.J 
.) 
1 Elias then? 
2 
3 
A. 
Q. 
Because that's what they both go by, is Elias. 
Well, I thought you said just a moment ago that you 
4 didn't know what this guy 1 s name was'? 
5 A. I don 1 t know his nane. They both go by Elias or Dad. 
6 He goes by Da~. 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
· -- ·13-
14 
15 
Q. 
A. 
went by. 
Q . 
A. 
Q. 
A . 
Q. 
A. 
So if he goes by Dad -
And ~ey goes - both Elias or Dad._ That's what he 
So - so you do know him a little bit? 
I've seen him, yeah, but I don't know of him. 
And he goes by Dad or Elias? 
Okay. We' 11 call him the father. 
Okay. 
16 Q. Okay. Or Dad. I.et' s call him Dad. So do you see 
17 Dad arguing with anybody? 
No, I did not. 
Did you see Elias arguing with anybody? 
No, I did not. 
18 
19 
20 
21 
A. 
Q . 
A. 
Q. And so the only person you saw arguing was Riqo and a 
22 girl? 
-• . -
23 A. Yes. 
24 Q. And you don't know the girl's name? 
25 A . (Nodding.) 
ANGELO GALLEGOS - Cross by MR. RICHARDS 18 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
And there was only just two of them there arguing? 
Yeah, just them two. 
And then did you see - you said you hear a shot? 
Yeah. 
And did you see who fired that shot? 
I do not. 
Do you know where it came from? 
I do not. 
Okay. And once that shot was fired, then everybody 
10 gets in the car? 
11 A. No. There was - before we even entered the car, 
12 there was already one or two shots being shot. There was one 
13 or two shots before I entered the car. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
And you climbed clear into the back seat? 
Yep. 
And you were by a little kid? 
----
No. I was by the girl in the back. 
And how old was she? 
I don't remember. 
Was she two or five or 10 or 15? 
She was older than 10. 
All right. And who else gets into the car? 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. It was me, Elias, Riqo and the two kids, the driver. 
24 That was it. 
25 Q. Okay. And Elias was in the middle seat? 
ANGELO GALLEGOS - Cross by MR. RICHARDS 19 
l 
l. 
I.... 
) 
1 A. Yes. 
2 Q. And so then the car starts driving? 
3 A. Yes. 
4 Q. And shots are being fired? 
5 A. Yes. 
6 Q. But you aren't able to see in which direction they 
7 were being fired? 
8 
9 
A. 
Q. 
10 fired? 
11 A. 
I do not. 
Okay. And you don't - you didn't see them being 
I looked up and I seen shots being fired fran the 
12 right passenger of the vehicle that I was in. 
13 Q. You said you couldn't see them being fired, though, 
14 could you? 
15 A. Unh-unh. But I heard - I heard them. You can only 
16 hear fran what a gunshot sounds like when you' re four feet 
17 away. 
18 Q. r· understand. And they were driving down - if I may 
19 approach - so you get into the car here? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And then - well, where's the argument? 
In front of the car. 
So right here? 
Right here. 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. Okay. Also it's right here, right? That's where the 
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1 argument was? 
2 A. That's where the car \vas parked. That's where the 
3 argument was. 
And then you hear sare shots? 
Two. One or two shots. 
And you don't know where they came fran? 
Unh-unh. 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
And then they get into the car and then what happens? 
There wasn't even a chance for - we were already in 
10 the vehicle once I heard the shots. 
11 Q. So you were in the vehicle -
12 A. Well, I wasn't in the vehicle at the time, but I was 
13 I was entering - I was entering the car when I heard the 
14 shots. 
15 Q. And was Riqo in the vehicle when -
16 A. Yes, he was. 
1'7--- - --Q, And so he '.S-not-.the...one that did the two shot.s_th.en, _ 
18 right? 
19 A. I have no - I don't lmow. But after I seen -
20 Q. Well, you heard - according to your testimony, you 
21 heard him shoot moments later, and you could tell it was him 
22 shooting? 
23 
24 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
And so if you couldn't tell at that moment, then it 
25 must have been sc::mebody else that was firing these two shots. 
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li.., 
-
~ 
J 
.) 
.) 
) 
J 
J 
) 
__) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
Is that a fair statement? 
A. Yes . 
Q. Okay. And so then you get into the car, and does it 
bac:k up a little bit and then go out? 
A. No, it accelerated forward. 
Q. Was there a car parked right here in front of it? 
A. Not that I can remember. 
Q. If there was, it would have had to hit it, or she 
9 would have? 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
A. I don't remember. I -
Q. Okay. So they accelerate forward driving down the 
street, and several shots are fired as they drive down the 
street? 
Yes. 
How fast was the car going? 
I don't know. I don't remember. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Okay. Was Elias wearing a white shirt, or were you? 
I don't remember. 
Do you remember what you were wearing? 
A. I don't. 
Q. Okay. Now, let me show you this Exhibit No. 2 . 
you identify that? 
A. That's me. 
Q. That's a picture of you? 
A. Yeah. 
ANGELO GALLEGOS - Cross by MR. RICHARDS 
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1 Q. Okay. I 1 d move for Exhibit No. 2 to be admitted. 
2 MR. SHAW: It's irre1evant, your Honor. It's a 
3 photograph of the witness; ccmpletely irrelevant to this case. 
4 And ma.y we approach the bench? 
5 THE COURT: All right. 
6 
7 
8 
9 have. 
10 
(Discussion held at the bench.} 
THE COURT: All right. I' 11 sustain the objection. 
MR. RICHARDS: I think that 1 s all the questions I 
Just a moment. 
Q. (BY MR. RICHARDS) Do you ever recall attending a 
11 barbecue with Elias senior or Dad as you call him? 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
A. No, I do not. 
Q. With your brother Jeremy? 
A. No, I do not. 
Q. Did you have a gun that night? 
A~ No. 
Q. Were you dumping or unloading a weapon that night? 
A. No, I was not. 
19 MR. RICHARDS: That's all the questions I have. 
20 THE COURT: Mr. Shaw any other questions? 
21 REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
22 BY MR. SHAW: 
23 Q. Just so we are clear about who exited the Yukon, do 
24 you recall whether the driver exited or did she stay in the 
25 car? 
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l 
ELIAS GARCIA 
1 Q. That's what you and Riqo were, the younger ones . 
.2 Then you have - after you' re in the late twenties or something 
3 like that you become a haney? 
4 A. I den' t know. I didn't get to that stage. 
5 Q. I understand you didn't, but you know the process. 
6 Is that right? And eventually you become an original gangster. 
7 Correct me if I am not telling you right. 
8 A. Yes. 
9 Q. That's correct? All right. And you understand that 
10 an original gangster has some authority over the pee wee 
homeys, correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. An original gangster can order a pee wee homey to 
take the faJ.l for another person. Is that right? 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
A. Could I ask what you are trying to ask me? Could you 
just get to the point? Because you are confusing me with these 
1 7 questions. 
18 Q. Well, I'm trying to be as clear as I can. Does the 
19 - the origina1 gangster has the ability to give orders to pee 
20 wee homeys, correct? Which you were. 
21 
22 
23 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Well, we make our own decisions. 
Okay. But you' re influenced by what the 0G says? 
No. 
24 Q. Okay. It 's true, is it not, that the original 
25 gangster occasionally tells a pee wee to take the faJ.l for 
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l another crime, somebody else's crime, isn't it? 
2 A. I don't think anybody in their right mind would take 
3 the fall for somebody else's crime. 
4 Q. No, except that if you don't do what the original 
5 gangster says, then you may be hurt, your family may be hurt, 
6 correct? 
7 
8 
A. 
Q. 
Correct. You may -
So if you don't want to get hurt or you don't want 
9 your family to get hurt, you do what the original gangster 
10 tells you to do? 
11 
12 
13 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Not, not all the time. 
Okay. Usually? 
No. There's nobody - I ain't never ever listened to 
14 any of my - over a gangster, the original gangsters. If they 
15 told me to go do something, if I didn't want to do it, I 
16 wouldn't act upon it because they told me to go do it. 
17 Q. If there's - if you don't do something that the 
18 original SJclllgster tells you to do, they have ways of scaring 
19 you into doing that, don't they? 
20 
21 
A. 
Q. 
Um, I don 1t see how. 
Well, a drive-by shooting of a home, for instance. 
22 You are aware that those occur, aren't you? 
Yes. 23 
24 
A. 
Q. Yes? And if someone were to drive by Riqo's home or 
25 his grandma's home where he would stay and shoot it up, that 
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) 
j 
J 
.) 
) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
would be a warning situation,. wouldn't it? 
A. But from. the side. What are you talking about? 
Q. Well, are you aware 
A. Because there's two gangs - two gangs involved in 
this, not just one. 
Q. I understand. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
So what side, what $ide you talking about? 
Either side. 
No. I couldn't tell you. I -
Q. You're aware that Riqo's grandma's house has been 
shot at least twice since this incident occurred -
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
A. It's been shot at multiple times before this occurred 
too . 
- 15 
16 
17 
Q. Okay. 
A. It Is been bombed. 
Q. All right. A Molotov cocktail, right? That' s a 
cannister full of gasoline that gets thrown onto that house. 
18 And those are sometimes done as warnings, aren't they, that you 
19 better do what the 0G says or you are going to have trouble, 
20 correct? 
21 A. (Nodding. ) 
22 
23 
Q. All right . And since this has happened, at least 
twice Riqo's house to the best of your knowledge has been 
24 drive-by shot or molotoved? 
25 A. I haven't known it's been shot or been drive-by. I 
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1· haven 1 t.had ariy affiliation to do with Riqo or anything towards 
2 that nature of the gang life or anything. I've been trying to 
3 move on with my life. And then I get threats from Ogden 
4 Trece' s. I get shot at frea'n Ogden T~ece' s. I get chased by 
5 from Ogden Trece I s for doing what I am doing today from what I 
6 did. 
7 
8 
9 
Q. 
A. 
.Q. 
You go to Iowa, didn 1 t you? 
Yes. 
And.you were afraid of the.~orterios at that point, 
10 weren't you? Is that why you went to Iowa? 
11 A. No. I went to Iowa because even before that 
12 happened, I was trying to change my life. 
13 Q. But you went to . Iowa because a . fellow by the name. of . 
14 Paul Ashfield (phonetic) was shot in retaliation by Nortenos 
15 for this incident. Is that correct? 
16 A. I didn't go to Iowa because of that. 
17 Q. You went irrmediately after that, didn't you, within a 
18 day? 
19 
20 
21 Iowa? 
A. 
Q. 
I already had my ticket. 
Okay. Do you remember talking to an officer Gent in 
· 22 A.-- ·Do-z remember-talking·-to·him? 
23 
24 
25 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
When he came out? 
Do you remember an Officer Gent? 
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I... 
l 
1 A. Yes, I got in contact with him. 
2 Q. And did you tel.l him that when he asked you it I s 
3 tough, at least you were smart enough to get out of there and 
4 asked you who Paul was. Do you recall him asking you that? 
5 A. Um, I really don't recall him asking me that. 
6 Q. You don't recall that? And you said, "Who hit Paul?" 
.7 Do you recall telling that to Officer Gent? 
8 A. No. I -
All right. You don't recall that? 9 
.10-
Q. 
A. I remember--talking to Officer Gent, but I- don't - ·I 
11 don't recall. I don't - it's not caning back to me that I 
12 taJ.ked to him about that. I probably did. I'm not saying I 
13 didn I t, but I don't remember. 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A long time ago? 
Yeah. 
Over two and a half years ago? 
Yes. 
And you - I want to go a little bit to what your 
19 rendition is of what happened that night of August 5th at this 
20 location here on the map. You said that Riqo was in the front 
21 passenger seat? 
22 A. That's right. 
23 Q. And you saw him shoot the gun? 
24 
25 
A. 
Q. 
That IS right• 
And how did - how would you see him shoot the gun? 
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1 A. Because he was hanging out the - he was hanging out 
2 the car when he did it. I was right behind him. 
3 
4 
5 
Q. You were behind him? 
A. Right behind him. 
Q. And so he's hanging out so you can see him through 
6 the windshield or where? 
7 A. I'd have to be in the front to see him through the 
8 windshield. I was in the back seat. 
9 Q. So you see him hanging out. Where is he hanging out 
10 is 111¥ question? 
11 
12 
A. 
Q. 
The driver - the passenger front seat. 
He's hanging out the passenger front seat window? 
13 Door? 
..... 
A. Door. 
Q. So the door is open? Or do you remember? 
14 
15 
16 A. I just know that he was hanging out, holding onto the 
17 thing that he climbed into the SUV with firing a gun. 
There's a handle right there? 
Yes. 
18 
19 
20 
Q. 
A. 
Q. Kind of part way down in the front of the window. So 
21 he's hanging out holding that? Is that right. Is that what 
22 you are saying? 
23 
24 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
Okay. And so you are seeing him shoot through the 
25 front windshield, or how are you seeing him? 
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1 A. He's shooting over a car back towards the people 
2 because we was driving off. So he was shooting over the car 
3 back towards the group. 
4 Q. All right. And so you didn't actually see him fire 
5 the gun; you just heard it? 
6 A. We.ll, I heard the gun go off, and then I seen the gun 
7 when he came back in with it. 
8 Q. Did you have a gun that night? 
9 A. Did I have a gun that night? 
10 Q. Yes. 
11 A. Yes, I did. 
12 Q. Did you fire it? 
13 A. No, I didn't. 
14 Q. Now, after you drove away - well, 
15 Do you know Angelo 
Yes. 
- Gallegos? 
Yes, I do. 
How long have you known Angelo? 
let me ask this. 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A . Fo'=---~--~~~~~e, f°-r _c9. __ little ~l:~~--- ~or_ probab)-y about 
. .. 21 the same time, if not longer as nru.ch as I've known- Riqo. 
22 Q. 
23 Riqo? 
24 
25 
A. 
Q. 
So you've known him almost as long as you've known 
About as long. About as long. 
Did you hang out with Angelo? 
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A. Not really that much. 
Q. But he knew who you were? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Did you go to barbecues with him? 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 A. Yes. We were - I went to a barbecue at his house at 
6 one point. 
Q. A ba:cbecue at his brother Jeremy's place? 
A. Yes. 
7 
8 
9 Q. And you hung out with him? So he would know who you 
10 are, wouldn't he? 
11. 
12 
- i:r 
14 
15 
16 
A. Yes.. . . 
Q. Did he know your name? 
A. Yes·: - ...... ·- .. . 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
So if he denied knowing you, he's lying? 
I guess. 
I want to talk about after you left the scene. Did 
17 - you never heard Riqo threaten anybody, did you? 
18 A. No. I heard him be confused. 
19 Q. Okay. He was confused, but he never threatened to 
20 put a bullet in anybody? 
21 A. No. 
22 Q. Now, you talked to Detective Gent because you were 
23 worried that you were going to get charged with this crime, 
24 weren't you? 
25 A. I called Detective Gent because my cousin Sarah got 
ELIAS GARCIA - Cross by MR. RICHARDS 48 
- . ·(;,, 
1 ahold of me. 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
And that's Sarah Valencia? 
Yes. 
Okay. 
And me and her had a good talk. And --
And you were afraid that you were going to get turned 
7 in and charged with this crime, were you not? 
8 MR. HEWARD: Judge, I would object. The witness is 
9 in the middle of trying to answer a question. Counsel didn't 
10 give him a chance to finish and went on to the next one. 
11 THE COURT: Are you done with your answer, or do you 
12 need a second? 
13 Q. (BY MR. RICHARDS) Yeah, please answer. 
14 A. I got ahold of rrry cousin Sarah. My cousin Sarah got 
15 ahold of me. 
16 Q. Okay. 
17 A. And we talked. And she knew it wasn't me that did 
18 it. She knew who did it. And she didn't want to see me she 
19 didn't want to see me - see it be framed on me for the one 
20 that did it. 
21 Q. Okay. So you decided to talk to Detective Gent 
22 because of that? 
23 A. (Nod.ding. ) I decided to talk to Detective Gent 
24 because not only because of that, because I found out it was 
25 right for me to be honest and for -
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1 Q. And - and for what? 
2 A. -- and for people that involved with this to know the 
3 truth. 
4 Q. Okay. And you haven't been very honest in a lot of 
5 things, have you? 
6 A. Been honest about what? You got to be specific about 
7 your question. I don't know exactly what you are saying when 
8 you say that. 
9 Q. Let me ask another question. Shortly after you were 
10 dropped. off, you went - you got picked up and went in another 
11 car driven by Brian Moore or a Tara Sweet. Is that correct? 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
17 recall. 
A who? 
A Brian Moore and Tara Sweet. 
No. 
Do you recall that? 
Do you recall telling Brian Moore 
MR. HEWARD: I' 11 object, Judge. He said he didn't 
MR. RICHARDS: Well, I think I can ask him -18 
19 THE COURT: I' 11 give you a little latitude, but his 
20 answer is he doesn't know who this fellow is. 
21 
22 car 
23 
24 
25 
Q. (BY MR. RICHARDS) You don't recall getting in a 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
No. 
- with a fellow? 
We didn't get into a car with no guy naned Brian. 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
Q. And do you recall talking or telling Brian that you 
may have seen me on the news; I '.m the one that shot the two 
people? 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
A. No. I don't even know who this Brian guy is. I 
don't even know nobody by the name of Brian. 
Q. You don't know Brian 
A. No. 
Q. -- Moore or a Tara Sweet? 
A. No. 
Q. Okay. I think that's all I have. 
MR. HEWARD: I just have one follow up. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. HEWARD: 
Q. Chris, what caliber gun did you have that night? 
A. I had a 25. 
Q. 
A. 
Was that gun even functioning? 
It had no firing pin. 
MR. HEWARD: That's all. 
19 THE COURT: Any questions? 
20 RECROSS-EXAMINATION 
21 BY MR. RICHARDS: 
22 Q. It seems a little odd to me in that -
23 MR. HEWARD: I'll object, your Honor, to it seems a 
24 little odd to me. That 's not a question. 
25 THE COURT: Yeah. Reword the question if you would. 
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